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Abstract:  
Hardening data protection using multiple methods rather than ‘just’ encryption is of 
paramount importance when considering continuous and powerful attacks to observe, steal, or 
even destroy private and confidential information. 
Our purpose is to look at cost effective data protection by way of combining 
fragmentation, encryption, and then dispersion over several physical machines. This involves 
deriving general schemes to protect data everywhere throughout a network of machines where 
they are being processed, transmitted, and stored during their entire life cycle. This is being 
enabled by a number of parallel and distributed architectures using various set of cores or 
machines ranging from General Purpose GPUs to multiple clouds. 
In this report, we first present a general and conceptual description of what should be 
a fragmentation, encryption, and dispersion system (FEDS) including a number of high level 
requirements such systems ought to meet. Then, we focus on two kind of fragmentation. First, 
a selective separation of information in two fragments a public one and a private one. We 
describe a family of processes and address not only the question of performance but also the 
questions of memory occupation, integrity or quality of the restitution of the information, and 
of course we conclude with an analysis of the level of security provided by our algorithms. 
Then, we analyze works first on general dispersion systems in a bitwise manner i.e. without 
data structure consideration; second on fragmentation of information considering data 
defined along an object oriented data structure or along a record structure to be stored in a 
relational database. We present an extension of Shamir’s algorithm with similar security 
analysis and conclude that combining data fragmentation, encryption, and dispersion 
constitutes a potent process to protect data. 
 
Key Words:  
Data protection, information protection, fragmentation, defragmentation, data dispersion, 
encryption, selective encryption, AES, DCT, DWT, FHE, Shamir algorithm, security analysis, 
image encryption, General Purpose GPU computation, multilevel security, Cloud Computing, 
database, privacy 
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Résumé (in French): 
Nous présentons une description conceptuelle générale d’un système de fragmentation et 
de défragmentation des données afin de les mieux protéger. Nous identifions de nombreux 
besoins et propriétés de haut niveau associées à des traits d’architecture qu’un tel système doit 
adresser et posséder avec un souci de performance et de cout optimisés. Il nous parait 
aujourd’hui important de combiner tout à la fois fragmentation, chiffrement et dispersion dans 
une architecture qui se doit de rester efficace avec un cout bien maitrisé.  
Nous avançons sur plusieurs fronts. D’une part, nous expérimentons avec la protection 
sélective de données multimédia ou textuelle en développant de nouveaux algorithmes permettant 
de séparer automatiquement l’information qui sera traitée de façon confidentielle de la donnée 
qui pourra être traitée de façon publique, par exemple stockée sur un cloud. Nous avons pu 
mettre au point une famille d’algorithmes de protection sélective des données (images bitmap ou 
texte) avec des performances supérieures à une encryption complète de l’image sur CPU ou 
GPGPU. Pour ce faire, nous avons parallélisé le traitement des algorithmes et utilisé des 
architectures utilisant à la fois le processeur central (CPU) et les processeurs graphiques 
(GPGPU). Cette famille d’algorithmes propose à l’utilisateur des niveaux de protection 
différents (fort ou léger) pour des usages de protection adaptés. Nous avons généralisé ces 
méthodes vers d’autres natures ou formats de données (en particulier, texte et vidéo) en 
choisissant une transformation intègre (ondelettes) pour séparer données privée et donnée 
laissées publiques.  
Pour traiter des données de façon non sélective, nous avons pu développer un état de l’art 
en deux parties. Le premier comporte six systèmes (trois commerciaux et trois académiques) avec 
diverses propriétés. Ces systèmes sont caractérisés par le fait qu’ils ne font aucune hypothèse sur 
la structure de la donnée qu’ils ont à protéger. Leur analyse donne une grille multicritère de 
lecture et d’évaluation de tout système ayant un modèle similaire. La seconde partie de l’état de 
l’art présente des systèmes plus anciens et plus classiques pour lesquels l’usager décrit les 
différents niveaux de confidentialité d’une donnée dont le système connait également la structure 
(soit orientée objet, soit base de données). Nous avons également travaillé à l’extension de 
l’algorithme de Shamir pour prendre en compte des données de grande taille, nous avons 
parallélisé son code pour obtenir des performances acceptables. 
 
Mots clés:  
Protection des données, protection de l’information, fragmentation, défragmentation, 
dispersion des données, chiffrement, chiffrement sélectif, AES, DCT, DWT, FHE, algorithme de 
Shamir, chiffrement d’images, analyse de sécurité, sécurité multiniveau, General Purpose GPU, 
Cloud Computing, base de données, privacy 
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1. Introduction 
 
With over three decades long, outsourcing information storage and processing, 
cloud-based services for data storage have gained in popularity and today can be 
considered as mainstream. They attract organizations or enterprises as well as individual 
users who do not want or cannot cope with the cost of a private cloud. Beside the economic 
factor, both groups of customers subordinate their choice of an adequate cloud provider to 
other factors, particularly resilience, security, and privacy. 
Hardening data protection using multiple methods rather than ‘just’ encryption is 
becoming of paramount importance when considering continuous and powerful attacks to spy, 
alter, or even destroy private and confidential information. Even if encryption is a great 
technology rapidly progressing, encryption is ‘just’ not enough to progress with this unsolvable 
question not mentioning its high computational complexity. In [Adrian…15], it is shown how to 
compromise https sites with 512-bit group; the authors even suggested that 1024- bit encryption 
could be cryptanalyzed with enough computational power. Cryptographs never like the idea that 
a cypher can be broken and information can be read given sufficient computational resources, this 
is nevertheless one of the central design tenets of a number of projects like the Potshards system 
[Storer…09]. Moreover, there remains the difficult question of the management of the encryption 
key that over time, can be known by too many people, and stolen or lost. 
 
Our purpose and ultimate ambition is to look at data protection and privacy from end to 
end by way of combining fragmentation, encryption, and then dispersion. This means to derive 
general schemes and architecture to protect data during their entire life cycle everywhere they go 
throughout a network of machines where they are being processed, transmitted, and stored. 
Moreover, it is to offer users choices among various well understood cost effective levels of 
privacy and security which would come with predictable levels of performance in terms of 
memory occupation, energy consumption, and processing time. However, we have to reduce this 
long term ambition in order to stay within the means and workload defined in the CAP project. 
For this project our focus will be set on protecting data during their storage. For that purpose, we 
will assume that our end user will have a resource limited personal environment and will look at a 
third party storage provider with a cost effectiveness additional constraint. 
In the recent past, major enterprises (Sony
1
 or Yahoo
2
 for instance) have been seriously 
attacked. Even political organizations are not escaping to hackers and other intelligence 
organizations. On this basis, it is only natural to assume that at least one ‘uninvited’ unidentified 
program is hosted on at least one machine and has acquired the rights to be able to observe, share 
with other ‘uninvited’ components, steal, or even destroy data that are processed, transmitted 
through, or stored on this very machine. This machine is in general part of a distributed system 
and for instance, can be part of a datacenter or a cloud. We will assume though, that machines 
where data are entered or presented in clear to an authorized end-user are under his responsibility 
and can be trusted. In other words, it does not seem reasonable to make information accessible in 
                                                 
1
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Pictures_hack 
2
 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html?_r=1  
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clear to an authorized end-user and simultaneously on the same machine, not available to an 
uninvited party or component. 
 
In this report, we first present a conceptual description of what is a general fragmentation 
and defragmentation system including a number of high level requirements. Then, we focus on 
fragmentation for protecting data during their storage and plan to take a deeper look at other data 
life cycle phases (transmission or processing) in another project. We first consider a bitmap 
image describing results published in [Qiu…14] and enhanced in [Qiu…15]: we discuss previous 
works on selective encryption methods and their performance issue. We present the designs of 
our method in particular, introducing a new design which provides a strong level of protection. 
We discuss their parallel implementations using GPGPU (General Purpose Graphics Processing 
Unit). Moreover, in order to obtain good performance, the implementation of data fragmentation 
is performed partly on a CPU, partly on a GPU. We observe as expected that computation is 
considerably sped up particularly when matrix computation is involved (in line with 
[Modieginyane…13]). We are analyzing in details performance, security, and integrity issues, 
and conclude by describing how selective encryption can be used to safely store public fragments 
in public storage systems.  
Then, we analyze works first, on general data dispersion systems in a bitwise manner, 
comparing academic and commercial solutions. Second, we gather publications on 
fragmentation in a structurewise manner considering data stored either in an object oriented 
system or in a structured database, following a survey started in [Kapusta…15]. 
Beside some standard images that be found on the web, small textual or video samples, 
we have been experimenting with La Poste data available in the ITEA2 CAP project to explore 
and experiment with scalability of our methods. More details about our working environment in 
terms of hardware, software, and data can be found in the Annex, section 12. 
1.1. Dissemination 
Early results of this project were about image protection and were published in [Qiu…14] and 
expended in [Qiu…15]. Then a state of the art on general fragmentation methods was published 
[Kapusta…15], and [Memmi…15] and then presented at the FOSAD Summer School 
(http://www.sti.uniurb.it/events/fosad16/kapusta.pdf). Additionally, two posters were accepted at 
the RAID’16 Symposium ([Kapusta…16b] and [Qiu…16]) and another one to ACM CCS’16 
Conference [Kapusta…16a] expended into a full paper and submitted for 2017 [Kapusta…17]. 
This report abundantly draws from these various publications. Several other publications are 
being prepared. At last, several student projects were proposed directly derived from this research 
and aiming at increasing the number of experiments using the code developed through the 
project. 
2. Motivations 
2.1. Data protection, integrity, and privacy 
Data must be protected during their entire life cycle (or at least during the period of time 
its owner cares about: data is aging and its pertinence can vary over time), not only when they are 
stored but also when they are transmitted from one location to another during which they can be 
intercepted and altered; later, when they are archived. Today, datacenters are continuously being 
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attacked, even if strong defense mechanisms are continuously put in place and updated, the risk 
stays acute and data protection to achieve security and privacy is a must for any user of public or 
hybrid storage system. 
 
2.2. Cost effectiveness 
With the increase of sources of data production at an unbelievable pace and the 
multiplication of possibilities to store them particularly in cost effective and public data storage 
areas, it becomes quite clear that opportunities to observe (by someone ‘honest but curious’, in 
particular like anyone from the hardware provider, the cloud provider, to the Saas provider) or 
worse to alter, or even destroy valuable data are accordingly multiplied.  
2.3. Independence  
With the diversification of data storage in public and remote areas, it becomes more and 
more necessary for users to efficiently protect their personal data (texts, images, or videos) by 
using their own tools independently from the ones offered by storage service providers and their 
affiliates. It seems reasonable to recommend that a user should have a security service provider 
independent from his other service providers. Otherwise, it would be a little bit like letting the 
fox guarding the henhouse.  
2.4. Resilience and availability 
Fragmentation is vastly used for resilience purposes. In [Rabin 89], we find one of the 
first results about fragmenting for both fault-tolerance and data protection. In [Kapusta…17], we 
address this question by using a Reed Solomon error correcting code [Reed…60] to avoid mere 
duplication. This solution is also used by many authors.   
2.5. Performance and scalability  
Protecting information can be achieved in many ways: by strictly controlling its access 
(through authentication techniques or access right policies), hiding it, or transforming it (through 
techniques like steganography, scrambling, encryption, anonymization, or obfuscation) and 
making it understandable solely by selected people who own a method, a map, or a key to 
efficiently retrieve, reverse the protective transformation, and get back the complete original 
information in a timely manner. 
During this process, it is sometimes possible to detect whether data has been accidentally 
or intentionally modified. These techniques can become extremely costly (in memory and time) 
especially with large or massive amount of data; hence the idea of adding another weapon to 
more traditional protection techniques: data fragmentation. Fragmentation means separating with 
a more or less complex algorithm data into pieces or fragments, considering confidentiality, data 
nature and size. In order to be cost effective, fragments will be protected differently according to 
their level of confidentiality or criticality. The nature of data, be a text, an image, or a video will 
greatly influence the type of analysis, methods and processes that will be performed to be 
effective. Fragments are then dispersed and stored in several different files. These files should in 
turn be stored in different physical machines in a more or less sophisticated manner in order to 
increase the level of protection of the whole information.  
It is assumed that massive amount of data have a non-uniform level of criticality or 
confidentiality (therefore, a non-uniform need for protection). Also, they have not been produced 
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at the same time, they are aging at a non-uniform pace which again relate to the non-uniform 
level of criticality and a need for a multilevel security system. Some critical data could then be 
separated and strongly encrypted, some other data less critical would be only fragmented and 
possibly more rapidly encrypted with a weaker encryption algorithm or even in some use cases, 
let clear. 
Last but not least, by definition, fragmentation enables the parallelization of transforming 
or encrypting pieces of information which lets us expect strong gain in efficiency compared with 
a full encryption sequentially executed, addressing scalability requirements. Defragmentation 
could then have to follow a reverse parallel pattern. 
2.6. Distributed Storage and Trusted Areas 
Whatever is the software solution used for protecting data, it is our belief that a complete 
solution will have to use hardened hardware (a trusted area of one or several machines) at one 
critical moment or another during the data life cycle. In particular, places where information is 
being fragmented or defragmented, encrypted or decrypted are particularly critical since the 
information is gathered in clear during a period of time. Also, places where information is being 
created, printed out, or visualized by a human end-user have to be trusted and protected from any 
uninvited observer. A last reason for considering a trusted area would be to use it as a safe and 
store ultra-confidential information even as this information is strongly encrypted. This point is 
widely recognized since a long time and in many publications ([Fray…86] or [Aggarwal…05] for 
instance) or by many industry experts.  
Of course, from a fragmentation point of view, data should not enter and exit this trusted 
area by a single port in a single iteration which would mean that in front of the trusted area, there 
would exist a non-trusted location where an observer (a ‘man in the middle’) can see the entire 
flow of information. A method has to be designed to gather and transmit data inwards and 
outwards a trusted area to the rest of the storage system. 
Trusted areas have a high cost; one goal for a fragmentation system is to minimize and 
possibly confine their usage although for the reason said earlier, their usage is and will stay 
unavoidable if we want to reach an end to end high level of confidentiality.  
2.7. Use cases 
Use cases are important since a specific architecture can comply with a set of use cases 
but at the same time may very well fail at addressing needs for another group of use cases. Use 
cases can be defined according to the number of desired authorized participants (one, two, or 
many), their roles as users or end-users (owner, author (who may not be the owner), read-only 
user, service provider,…) (aka Alice and Bob), the number and type of attackers (from honest but 
curious, eavesdropper (aka Eve), to malicious (aka Mallory), insider, man in the middle, coalition 
of attackers, powerful rogue enterprise,…), the type and location of attacks (at storage, 
transmission, processing time, …), the size, nature, and format of the data (image, video, text, 
database, unstructured data,…), the kind of distributed machine environments (one machine to 
another machine, one personal machine (from a laptop to a mobile device like smartphone or a 
tablet) to one cloud, a general distributed environment involving several providers,..). We can see 
by combining these various possibilities that use cases can be very contrasted and their number 
can be relatively high. 
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In this project, we consider mainly three use cases two of them with relatively similar 
solutions. First, an end-user (Alice) wants to save her multimedia data in a public cloud in order 
to save memory in her private resource-limited environment (be a desktop, a laptop, or even a 
smartphone), however, for privacy reasons, she does not want putting her entire data in the hands 
one public storage provider. Second, an enterprise wants to save a massive amount of data 
balancing confidentiality and cost effectiveness; it is considering using a hybrid cloud solution. 
Third, we consider a user with a massive amount of data that he wants to disperse over many 
different machines. 
3. Fragmenting for protecting 
 
Fragmentation is not a new idea. This concept is used in many domains like in economics 
or in history. To stay on the safe side, a banker will recommend not ‘putting all his eggs in the 
same basket’. In computer science, the concept of fragmentation can be found in many different 
applications and usages: by operating system to optimize disk space management, by database 
management or distributed systems to gain in performance particularly in latency, by routing 
algorithms in communication to increase reliability and support disaster recovery when 
combining replication and fragmentation together. A number of widely used technologies can be 
cited here like Apache Hbase, Google File System, [Raid], etc… 
It is also since the invention of writing used to keep a secret. In fact, we could almost 
consider a cipher as a splitting information algorithm since you need a key as a first fragment of 
information and an encrypted data a second information fragment in order to recover the original 
information. We are interested by the usage of any fragmentation technique in combination with 
encryption and fragment dispersion to protect data of any nature during storage, archiving, or 
transmission with applications in information privacy. 
 
Reasons for considering or reconsidering fragmentation for protection are manifold: the 
continuous scaling up of today distributed storage architectures; the massive amount of data 
produced every day by users or machines, the amazing amount of data and CPU that analytics 
applications need to gather and process, the need for these data to be transmitted from one server 
to another. A cloud is supported by a number of interconnected datacenters among which data 
can be dispersed and stored when latency is not an issue ([Bessani…11]) and a datacenter has a 
plethora of servers and distributed memory available. We can therefore think about scattering a 
large number of fragments all over while storing a very limited number of non-contiguous 
fragments on a single physical machine: the vast number of storage elements, the access to many 
servers make it worthwhile to revisit the old idea of fragmentation in order to protect data. We 
started to toy with this kind of motivations back in 2011 [Memmi 11]. A malicious or uninvited 
observer hidden on a single machine should never see more than a handful of (preferably 
semantically separated from each other (i.e. the knowledge of a fragment does not clarify the 
meaning of another one)) fragments and should never be in a position to observe a complete 
computation. This observer should feel like searching for many needles in many (potentially 
huge) haystacks. Of course, there is always the additional possibility to confine ultra-critical 
fragments in a private or trusted storage providing an even higher level of security and privacy. 
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3.1. Fragmentation definition 
By information fragmentation, we mean the process of constructing a covering (a 
partition is a special case and in fact, is the case used in this project and the unanimity of the 
literature) of the information by pieces of information that we will call fragments, each piece has 
been transformed according to a required level of protection such that it does not necessarily bear 
a sensible meaning for a human or even for a machine. This property certainly is at the very root 
of the idea of using and developing this mechanism to protect digital information. In this project, 
a fragment will be a unit of storage.  
Moreover, a fragmentation system should easily comply with Kerckhoffs’ second 
principle (see the original papers (in French) [Kerckhoff 1883] or the comprehensive history 
book on cryptography [Kahn 96]): it does not matter if a potential attacker knows how the 
fragmentation system works as long the location where fragments are stored and the way they 
should be decrypted and assembled is kept secret.  
We call F the set (or collection) of all fragments relatively to a data the end user wants to 
protect. We denote by n = |F| the number of fragments. For terminology reasons, we propose to 
differentiate the notion of segment from the notion of fragment: a segment is a particular 
fragment separated from the rest of the information along natural lines of division (typically a 
paragraph in a text, a group of records, a table in a database, a column of data of a column-
oriented database (see section 7.3), a group of objects, or a paragraph in a text); a fragment is a 
part, usually broken off. In general, a segment will have an understandable meaning for a human 
or a machine while a fragment is a more general piece of information (a sequence or a matrix of 
bits) possibly with little or no understandable meaning when considered without a context. 
Indeed, under these definitions, a segment must be seen as a special kind of fragment. 
Sometimes, the words chunk, share, or block can be found in the literature as synonyms for 
fragment. In this project, we will use the word chunk to define a first cut in clear of the original 
data before it is analyzed and protected, possibly aggregated for efficient storage purpose. 
We call map the information describing where fragments are stored, how to access to 
them, how they can be decrypted, and how they must be re-assembled. Typically, the cardinality 
of F, file names containing fragments, theirs location, and access rights, as well as encryption 
keys or the order along which fragments must be stitched back together belong to the map. 
Sometimes, one of these aspects will be missing, being either considered as obvious by users or 
kept confidential outside of the digital world (e.g. a piece of paper in a safe, in the mind of the 
end user). A map can be implemented in multiple ways; it is supposed to be a small piece of 
information. Of course, a map can be itself fragmented and distributed between several users; it 
can also be hidden in selected fragments.  
 
A public environment is almost by definition, particularly vulnerable. Any user can access 
to many servers loading persistent software that later have the ability to observe data in a stealth 
manner without being easily detected [Constantin 12]. We have to assume that computation or 
data is observed on at least one undetected machine. How to ensure that: never all fragments are 
stored or even transit through the same machine or in a somewhat weaker manner: never enough 
fragments to provide meaning are stored or transit through the same machine? If that was the 
case, fragmentation would be much weaker: only the order in which fragments pass by in front of 
an observer could still confuse him together with the fact that they belong to the same collection 
of fragments. To this regard, one can easily imagine building additional fake fragments (still 
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belonging to F) as decoys. A good decoy would be extremely easy to discard for the 
authorized user and of course, utterly confusing for the attacker. 
 
Fragmenting to achieve information protection can be considered as a simple idea; 
however, it is not so simple to efficiently design and develop a fragmentation system 
(including defragmentation of course) in order to comply with the motivations we just 
described and at the same time to avoid an important foreseeable overhead. 
One key question lies in the way fragments are built so the observation of one 
fragment is inconsequential.  
A simple strategy consists in separating critical information and to encrypt it from less 
sensitive information that can be let clear or plain. Beside criticality, size of fragments has to 
be taken into account: too small a size could lead to an unbearable overhead with a very large 
map, too large a size could create fragment bearing too vulnerable and large piece of 
information. 
At the same time, it would be nice to fragment with enough redundancy to address an 
availability requirement such as: the loss of one fragment is inconsequential. This idea was 
already outlined in [Fabre…94] without much detail though. In [Shamir 79], this resilience 
requirement is supported with a notion of threshold scheme (more details in 7.1.1). We say 
that F has a threshold of k if and only if any subset of k fragments is needed to reconstruct 
the entire data while k-1 is not sufficient. In that case, the loss of any n-k fragments is 
inconsequential. 
All these considerations clearly suggest that a naive partition and replication rarely 
will be an effective fragmentation regarding both data protection and resilience. 
It must be stressed out that data nature (text, image, audio, video, 3D…) and format 
(html, pdf, bmp, jpeg…) can also influence the way fragmentation is performed. Data may be 
organized in an object oriented way. It can be stored in databases with records. Data can 
sometimes be segmented along these kinds of structures ([Fabre…94], [Ciriani…10]). More 
details are described in section 7.3. 
3.2. Defragmentation 
Defragmentation consists in reconstituting the information necessary to the end-user 
from fragments to be found in the storage area. Of course, the place where defragmentation is 
performed is a place of high vulnerability since this is where a meaningful piece of 
information is assembled then made clear for the end user. Defragmentation can be perceived 
with a triple challenge: Where are fragments requested by the user to be found and are they 
accessible? How many of them are needed? How should they be deciphered, stitched, and re-
assembled together? Without a map as defined in 3.1, defragmentation can be as tangled as 
firstly finding many needles in many haystack followed by resolving a jigsaw puzzle, 
especially when fragments arrive in a random order. The smaller are the fragments, the more 
they are, the more defragmentation will be involved and complicated. It is also possible that 
only a few of them are needed to answer a specific user query. Therefore, some effort must be 
dedicated to design efficient defragmentation algorithms and methods, including their 
protection.  
Moreover, it is important to include an integrity requirement to this task. 
Fragmentation can be bundled with data transformation (like encryption): the process of 
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fragmenting defragmenting information must avoid arithmetic operations on real or floating 
point numbers with rounding possibilities to preserve integrity (this point will be discussed in 
details section 6.4.3.). Another operation that can produce integrity problems is transmission 
through communication channels with a given error rate. Fragmentation has to be designed 
with this kind of possible problem and avoid cascading effect. 
We can consider defragmentation as the end of fragments life cycle: if after 
defragmenting and processing (i.e. modifying or updating) his information, a user wants to 
store again his information, we propose that he fragments anew his information creating a 
new brand family of fragments by changing a couple of parameters or seeds. By doing so, we 
would not have to trace and record which changes modify which fragment and where 
modified fragments have been stored and we would not have to verify and ensure that 
fragments are stored back to their original physical machine. These ideas involve resolving 
the questions of fragments clean up and deletion which can be tricky when thinking of 
backups. These questions are not addressed in the literature: a good number of papers 
describe one method of fragmentation; very few of them tackle the non-trivial question of 
defragmentation. We have not found any paper looking at the entire picture covering the 
entire information life cycle. 
4. Technical challenges and high level requirements 
4.1.  Quality and cost effectiveness of data protection 
Here, we consider four different dimensions: the volume or size of data to be 
protected, the level of protection the user wants to reach, the level of confidentiality or 
criticality of the data, the level of trust a machine is supposed to have and provide. 
Obviously, the more a data is confidential, the more the user wants to store it in a trustworthy 
place. Although they are different, there is a natural strong relationship between level of 
confidentiality and level of protection since an end-user will want to protect information in 
proportion of its level of confidentiality. We believe that a large amount of uncompressed 
data contains uneven levels of confidentiality, therefore, the need for protection and machine 
trustworthiness can gradually be set in proportion of the level of confidentiality. Figure 1 
shows data represented by what we nicknamed a ‘cone of confidentiality’ to illustrate our 
thesis that in a large uncompressed amount of data, there is most of the time a large amount 
of data that can be considered as non-confidential and a relatively small amount of data that 
must be considered as confidential. This unproven thesis directly leads to consider multilevel 
security systems since they directly infer cost effective methods of storage on machines with 
various level of trustworthiness. Hybrid cloud architectures respond to similar tradeoff 
between cost effectiveness and confidentiality. 
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Figure 1 : ‘Cone of confidentiality’: Data confidentiality, machine trustworthiness, and data size 
Assessing risks and defining a notion of quality of data protection is not an easy task 
especially with this concept of multilevel security. More than one user can be hesitating about 
what is sensitive from what is not. In section 6, we show how algorithms used in data 
compression can be used to separate information and support in automating this decision 
making. It can be addressed partially for instance, by comparison with classical encryption 
standard such as AES [AES 01] of the full information to be protected. Beside this kind of 
benchmark, statistical methods can be considered (see section 6.6), then more intensive 
security tests can be performed. 
An attack can evolve over time and spread over several servers. An attack can be the 
result of a coalition of several attacks. The quality of data protection can vary with regard to 
the severity of the attack. This is not among the least elements that contribute in making this 
notion so difficult to master. 
4.2. Performance and energy management 
Fragmentation and defragmentation are resource demanding: it consumes extra CPU 
time and energy. It also often consumes more memory, more importantly it …fragments 
information among several physical storage devices since fragments should be stored in a 
discontinued and distributed fashion to achieve a strong level of protection. 
Measuring performance particularly the overhead due to fragmentation and 
defragmentation is critical to understand how successfully this technique can potentially be 
deployed. To this regard, a user should accept to pay a price in overhead compared to dealing 
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with his data with no protection. Fragmentation ought to be definitely faster than a full data 
encryption and must target performance a user can tolerate.  
Parallelization in general, will obviously be the privileged way to obtain acceptable 
performance compared to a full data encryption; since data is fragmented, encryption (and 
decryption) of data can be performed in parallel on different servers or processors  for 
different fragments. Size of fragments and strength of the encryption algorithm must be 
carefully chosen, implementation tradeoff has to be made since too many small fragments can 
create an unwanted additional and expensive overhead (a variation of Amdahl’s law should 
apply here) and too large fragments can lead to modest to poor encryption performance. 
When servers are geographically dispersed, it is important to consider latency. From a 
user point of view, latency is more acceptable during fragmentation than during 
defragmentation. Users may consider they are done as they hit the ‘send’ key of their 
keyboard and unless they wait for an acknowledgement, they do not care too much about the 
time taken for the fragments to reach their lieu of storage. On another hand, users won’t like 
to wait too long for retrieving their information once they request it. 
We will see in section 6 how the usage of a GPU as a special case of parallelization, 
can make selective encryption effective, hence usable [Qiu…14], [Qiu…15]. 
Energy consumption is also to be taken into consideration, especially with devices 
using batteries such as smartphones or networks of objects. 
4.3. Data life cycle and data management 
We envision data protection during its entire life cycle: data creation, version updates, 
backups, or archiving should be taken into account in our project. Updating data on a 
fragment basis can be attractive but complicated: the map would require careful 
corresponding updates and defragmenting could require a tool at the level of a configuration 
management system.  
Data is aging. With time passing by, data sees its level of confidentiality varying: 
frequently decreasing until becoming obsolete; seldom increasing although this can happens 
for instance, for protecting the privacy of someone becoming important. Another example 
would be the discovery of a strong correlation between a highly confidential data and a data 
considered not confidential. This evolution could be particularly interesting to look at when 
considering long term storage or archiving. This evolution can become a difficulty for 
anonymyzation methods which let clear a number of records in database. 
Data deletion on a fragment basis can pose similar problems as data updating.  
To be complete, data duplication managed by File systems (which are constantly 
fragmenting and defragmenting files for memory management reasons) and more generally 
by Operating System layers (including temporary files, log files, caches,…), data backups, 
and archiving also have to be considered since they potentially can inadvertently regroup 
dispersed fragments on the same server or storage space. In any case, they have the ability to 
duplicate fragments and store them on physical machines out of the control of the protection 
system and the end-user, maybe right within the visibility range of our uninvited observer. 
This interesting case will not be studied in this report. 
Another issue when dealing with databases is with services (e.g. searching) that can 
utilize data structures which could be centralized such as caching, indexing using hash tables, 
or dictionaries. Web management technology also can have an impact with tools like crawlers 
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or ontology builders. It is important to analyze whether these important data structures 
overcome the barrier of fragmentation and betray or multiply data locations. More generally, 
data duplication creates additional exposure and should be considered. 
4.4. Cloud Computing and Virtualization 
Cloud computing providers commonly offer services at three different levels: SaaS 
(Software as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service)  
through contracts. At the two first levels a customer will be offered Virtual Machines (VMs) 
for storing data and processing applications offered at the SaaS level. Virtualization 
mechanisms can prevent the end-user to store meaningful clusters of fragments in different 
physical machines by storing fragments in Virtual Machines without controlling where these 
VMs are assigned (which is after all, exactly what virtualization is all about: having the end-
user not to have to care where is data are stored!). On another hand, it is to be noticed that 
most cloud providers allow assigning VM to specific datacenters. It is also possible to design 
an architecture involving several cloud providers as proposed first in [Aggarwal…09], then 
[Hudic…12] or [Bohli…13] for applications where latency is not in a problem for the end 
user or for data which have no privacy regulation constraints and for instance, can be 
exported in any country. Of course, this supposes that providers are not communicating with 
each other, that they are not collaborating for a powerful third party. An interesting case 
about multiple cloud is to consider hybrid cloud architectures where users can store their 
sensitive data in their own private cloud that is under their entire control. A side advantage 
against an attacker is that multiple providers can imply multiple software environments 
including multiple operating systems. This level of heterogeneity can pose additional 
difficulties and in any case, increases the cost to observe or attack stored information.  
Another issue with virtualization has to do with memory consumption: encapsulating a 
single possibly small fragment per VM can be over expensive; a method will have to be 
designed to solve this issue. 
Eventually, fragmentation should first be studied within use cases where virtualization 
can be avoided: at the IaaS level or within cloud management systems where virtualization 
can be avoided by users such as bare metal cloud, e.g. [TransLattice_Storm] (with a relatively 
costly kind of contract). Once this first level solved, one should consider virtualization. 
4.5. Defragmentation avoidance 
Clearly, fragmentation protects information only as long as data is …fragmented. The 
question is: can we process data without defragmention? This question is very similar to the one 
set for encryption which finds a potential answer with homomorphic encryption. We will look 
into this possibility in section 5.3.1. 
4.5.1. Partial defragmentation 
In order to minimize risks and improve performance, it can be envisioned 
defragmenting just what is necessary to the end-user in a sort of lazy manner. 
Partial defragmentation according to the subset of data needed ought to be investigated 
since a simple piece of information is generally sufficient to answer a user query. A practical 
solution for partial fragmentation is to have let the other fragments in clear as it is the case in 
[Bkakria…13] for instance (see section 7.3.2 for more details). 
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4.5.2. Total defragmentation avoidance  
It would be ultimately pivotal with regards to a wide adoption of these techniques to 
be able to avoid defragmenting information all together by being able to perform some 
computation directly on fragmented data. How to perform such distributed computation with 
reasonable performance? We may want to look at multiparty computation as introduced in 
[Yao 82] with a solution optimized in [Ioannidis…03] or searchable encryption as described 
in [Curtmola…11]. Of course, it would always remain to present computation results in clear 
to the end user; this step has to be discarded from what we have called ‘total defragmentation 
avoidance. 
5. Towards a complete Fragmentation, Encryption, Dispersion 
System (FEDS) 
 
We call FEDS (for Fragmentation, Encryption, Dispersion System) a data protection 
system which includes the three phases: fragmentation, protection, and dispersion over a 
distributed environment. A ‘complete’ fragmentation system will include not only a 
fragmentation subsystem but should also include an effective defragmentation subsystem; it will 
have to cope with the technical challenges and high level requirements described in the former 
section. Figure 2 shows a possible workflow where fragmentation comes before encryption. This 
is to favor parallelization: fragmentation in the first phase of the process enables parallelizing 
encryption over as many fragments as CPU or threads are available. Any FEDS should carefully 
optimize its architecture for maximizing parallelization. Our notion of map is critical to obtain an 
efficient defragmentation; map management should not be forgotten in a FEDS design since it 
can be considered as the weak point of the system. 
So far, we only found few systems dedicated on protecting large amount of data stored on 
large, powerful, and distributed systems integrating fragmentation with various methods of data 
protection. Section 7 describes and compares a handful of such academic and commercial 
systems. 
5.1. Fragmentation System 
Data can be of different nature and format: text, image, sound, or video; it can be 
stored in simple files or various types of databases, SQL databases as well as noSQL 
databases as HBase or Cassandra. This may influence the way to consider and analyze 
information and support producing fragments at different levels of protection. 
Different environments and distribution of computation can be experimented with 
depending on the use case and its specific requirements under consideration. In this project, we 
used different environments; we particularly experimented with two different GPU architectures 
found on a desktop and a laptop. Then, we also used the Teralab platform (a tera-memory 
platform) for scalability studies; they are succinctly described in Annex: technical environment 
and access to the code. These different environments influence the definition of the best 
distribution of computation and justify to constantly evaluate the implementation to understand 
which software architecture fits best to a given hardware platform. 
 
Designing a FEDS, it will be necessary to proceed carefully and stepwise, to experiment 
with scalability both in terms of size of information and size and number of fragments in order to 
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understand how fragmentation and encryption method and implementation scale up or not, and 
eventually, test for security of course. 
 
A complete fragmentation system will have to address most of our different high level 
requirements described earlier in section 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 : Basic workflow of a FEDS system 
Information candidate to be fragmented should be first parsed and possibly 
transformed for being easily and efficiently analyzed in term of level of confidentiality to 
determine how to separate critical data from non-critical data, to decide which parts must 
accordingly be strongly encrypted eventually stored in a private area, and which fragments 
can be let plain and possibly stored in a public area with as little risk as possible. Beside the 
levels of confidentiality, the analysis also determines how data could be fragmented in terms 
of size of fragments, degree of redundancy.  
In our opinion, these two first steps should be permitted to be guided through user 
interaction to be effective: the user ought to know which information is critical which one is 
not, the user ought to know which level of protection he desires and take responsibility for it. 
He also can provide useful guidance about fragment size, strength of encryption, and location 
where to disperse and store which fragments. 
However, we have already seen that in case of an image, automatic analysis could be 
performed to separate critical information from non-critical one [Qiu…14] or [Qiu…15]. The 
case where data format is a text is addressed in section 6.8 using transformation algorithms 
inspired from compression technologies. Similarly to what has been successfully done with 
image compression, several ideas drawn from text compression techniques seem promising 
and could be experimented with. 
Fragmentation can be performed in several successive steps. For instance, in 
[Fray…86], files are divided in blocks then in fragments. 
For each fragment i, an encryption algorithm i is chosen; it can be depending on the 
size of the fragment (i.e. to comply with performance constraints) and the cri ticality of the 
information it contains. This encryption algorithm can be the identity if it is decided to let the 
fragment clear. This is one fundamental advantage of fragmentation over full encryption: 
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fragmentation offers the capability to customize the level of protection, the strength of the 
encryption algorithm with respect to the need expressed by the end-user or criticality of the 
piece of information to protect; opening an interesting opportunity of optimization in term of 
cost (performance, energy, memory). A fragment can be used to encrypt in some way another 
fragment. This idea can be used to address key management. 
It will be important at each step of the way to benchmark and compare results against 
the best known implementations of encryption algorithms used without fragmentation, tuning 
parameters to improve performance.  
It is well understood that progress in technology, progress in encryption 
implementation efficiency are continuous (see for instance, Vampire Lab benchmarks). This 
can influence the degree of parallelization of encryption or fragmentation. It can change the 
optimal size of fragments.  This remark constitutes a second justification for the selection 
step to be flexible. 
The last step is to decide on which machine to store which fragment. Ideally, it is 
important to avoid storing fragments which, when gathered, reconstitute a critical piece of 
information. It is also clearly recommended to store replicated fragments on different 
physical machines. At the same time, it is also important to minimize latency. This implies 
having the knowledge of the topology of distributed machines at disposal. 
5.2. Defragmentation System 
Then, it will be important to design and evaluate different fragmentation and 
defragmentation methods in particular addressing few of the technical challenges described 
earlier paying particular attention to performance and analyzing in details causes of overhead and 
quality of data protection, for instance, by tuning size and number of fragments. 
We then propose to understand how to dose encryption and fragmentation to reach a well-
balanced solution addressing at the same time performance, reliability, security and privacy.  
Each time, a protocol is derived, it will be necessary to understand its complexity and to 
validate, possibly prove its properties and behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 :  Basic workflow of a defragmentation system 
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Fragment retrieval must be fast; this probably is the step where end-users will feel latency 
the most acutely and with little tolerance. The user interacts with the FEDS system by selecting a 
piece of information (possibly by query) not necessarily its whole. This step must be aware of 
where fragments are stored (using the map) and which fragments will be useful to the selection of 
the user. 
Figure 3 is showing key elements of the defragmentation workflow; indeed, each 
decryption algorithm i corresponds to the encryption algorithm i used during the fragmentation. 
Again, it will use the map to access to the necessary key ki. 
Defragmentation can be pretty involved especially when fragments have been retrieved in 
a random order, when fragments overlap with each other, and when decoys have been produced 
during fragmentation and must now be discarded. This step can easily be parallelized where each 
machine processes and defragment a sub-group of fragments at a time. By doing so, some of the 
machines used for defragmenting can very well be in a non-trusted area.  
At last, it should not be forgotten to perform the inverse of the transformation used in the 
first steps of the fragmentation workflow. 
5.3. FEDS and data processing 
Protecting data during its processing is utterly difficult and efficiency of any solution 
largely remains an open question in basic research since it is indeed a very desirable property 
[Rivest…78]. We consider two possible venues: the first one consist in processing data that 
remain encrypted, the second is about  processing data while they stay fragmented to avoid 
defragmentation as much as possible since it is evidently a phase of high vulnerability. 
5.3.1. Processing encrypted data 
Homomorphic encryption ([Gentry 09b]) and searchable encryption [Curtmola…11] are 
both attractive techniques since they both allow operating (arithmetic and logical operations for 
homomorphic encryption; search of a character string for searchable encryption) directly on 
encrypted data without the need for decrypting them. The stumbling block is that these methods, 
despite recent progress, are extremely complex and expensive in both memory and execution 
time. Using them for protecting massive amount of data does not seem at first, very reasonable.  
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a concept first envisioned circa 1978 by [Rivest… 78] 
and then reworked and developed in [Gentry 09b]. This concept can be described through this 
simple question by C. Gentry: “Is there a way to delegate processing of your data without giving 
away access to it? We immediately understand the value proposition of such encryption 
algorithms even before considering outsourcing or public cloud computing since it is about 
performing computation with encrypted data in perfect security. The trustworthiness question in 
cloud computing has been discussed for years and today, there is still no perfect solution.  FHE 
could very well be this ‘perfect solution’ only once proven efficient from a performance point of 
view.  
Figure 4 shows how FHE can be used within a public cloud server to compute the value of 
a function f for a data Data: the user Alice sends the encrypted Data (with a key Key) and the 
function f to the cloud and will receive back an encrypted f(Data) (with a key Key’). The 
homomorphic property of FHE allows the cloud performing the computation of f(Data) without 
knowing or accessing to Data or f(Data). Alice will be able to decrypt f(Data). 
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Figure 4 How FHE works in a real scenario 
Other encryption algorithms are known for having partial homomorphic property
3
. For 
instance, RSA is homomorphic with regards to multiplication: If the RSA public key is modulus 
m and exponent e, then the encryption of a message x is given by:  
. 
The homomorphic property for the multiplication is then: 
, 
Related work 
  The FHE was built on math basis that can prove it is secure. Since in 2009, FHE based 
on ideal lattice is introduced by [Gentry 09a], three main branches of FHE schemes have been 
developed: lattice-based, integer-based and learning-with-errors (LWE) or ring-learning-with-
errors (RLWE) based encryption. 
The main focus of the theoretical cryptographic research community is currently on LWE 
and RLWE based FHE. LWE was introduced by Regev, and has been shown to be as hard as the 
worst case lattice problems. This problem has been extended to work over rings, and this 
extension increases the efficiency of LWE. 
Integer based schemes were introduced by van Dijk et al. as a theoretically simpler 
alternative to lattice based schemes and have been further developed to offer similar performance 
to existing lattice based schemes. 
Despite different math basis have different performance, none of them is efficient enough 
for actual applications. For example, key generation in Gentry and Halevi’s lattice based scheme   
takes from 2.5 seconds to 2.2 hours. And for the evaluation step, a recent research by Gentry et 
al. shows a homomorphic evaluation of AES requires 36 hours which is actually incredibly slow 
compared with hundreds MB/s with AES on a modern PC’s CPU.  
Another important limitation of FHE is with the memory usage. FHE generates very large 
cipher text and uses very large public keys to guarantee adequate security to prevent against 
possible lattice-based attacks. Gentry and Halevi’s FHE scheme uses public key sizes ranging 
from 17 MB to 2.25 GB. 
Current research is aiming at improving performance of FHE either by focusing on new 
basic mathematics results to reduce computation complexity or by implementing the existing 
FHE algorithms on different hardware (GPU or nanotechnology). New algorithms are expected to 
provide with an actual breakthrough in term of performance; however, on another hand, hardware 
progression is relatively limited with regards to the need for deploying FHE. 
 
Performance study 
                                                 
3
 see Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption 
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In this section, we provide current research results about performance of the existing 
algorithms and their implementations. We are adding our own implementation for comparison. 
As we mentioned earlier, theoretical breakthrough of algorithm may bring a revolution in term of 
acceptance of FHE, this may need many years of work. In the meantime, it is interesting to search 
for possible optimized solutions including by using existing powerful hardware to determine 
whether FHE is ever usable. Although many research articles have claimed the performance of 
FHE are slow or far from application, it seems important to characterize how slow FHE really is. 
Performance of the underlying crypto-primitives such as modular reduction and large 
multiplication are required in many of the FHE schemes. Actually, they are critical these 
operations could be significantly improved through the use of GPU, FPGA, or Asic technology. 
The first GPU implementation of a FHE scheme was presented by Wang et al. in 2012. 
The authors implemented the small parameter size version of Gentry and Halevi’s lattice-based 
FHE scheme on an NVIDIA C2050 GPU using the FFT algorithm, achieving speed up factors of 
7.68, 7.4 and 6.59 for encryption, decryption and the recryption operations, respectively. The 
FFT algorithm was used to target the bottleneck of this lattice-based scheme, namely the modular 
multiplication of very large numbers. 
An overview of previous FHE implementations on various platforms is presented in Table 
1 taken from [Doröz…13] where we added two additional implementations of our own, the first 
one on a CPU, the second one using our GPGPU. Clearly, since the platforms vary greatly 
according to available memory, clock speed, area/price of the hardware a side-by-side 
comparison is difficult and therefore this information is only meant to give an idea of what is 
achievable on various platforms.   
Much of the development so far focused on the Gentry-Halevi FHE, which intrinsically 
works with very large integers (million bit range). Therefore, a good number of works focused on 
developing FFT/NTT (Number Therotic Transform) based large integer multipliers. Currently, 
the only full-fledged (with bootstrapping) FHE hardware implementation is the one reported by 
[Doröz…15], which also implements the Gentry-Halevi FHE. At this time, there is a lack of 
hardware implementations of the more recently proposed FHE schemes, i.e. Coron et al.’s FHE 
schemes, BGV-style FHE schemes and NTRU based FHE. 
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Table 1 Performance study of FHE taken from [Doroz…15] where we added our own tests framed in 
beige 
Conclusion 
Results for different FHE algorithms and for limited evaluation functions (AES-128 bit 
here) were presented in Table 1. As in the European H2020 ECRYPT project [Archer…15b], we 
can conclude that FHE is still today far from real application. But here, thanks to this table, we 
can quantify the issue. The AES block is processed in about 1-5 mins on an Intel Xeon CPU 
which is the type of CPU currently used in workstations. A good GPU (Nvidia GTX 690) could 
help reducing this processing to about 7 seconds. However, considering that AES is processed at 
a hundreds MB/s on PC’s CPU, which equals almost 1 million blocks processed per second, the 
performance of FHE-AES is far too slow to be considered usable. Even if hardware platforms are 
upgraded, even if performance of the FHE-AES algorithm is improved one thousand times, FHE 
would be still too slow to be vastly deployed. 
The merit of Table 1 is not only to confirm the performance issue with FHE but also to tell 
us the magnitude of needed progression before deploying FHE. Our own code is on par with 
current publications. One possibility would be to use partial homomorphic encryption (PHE) or 
somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) but in any case, their usage would stay very limited 
to niche applications. Another possibility would be to go towards fundamental mathematical 
research and devise new multiplication algorithms like in [Rambaud 15] despite high difficulties 
to progress in this kind of direction. 
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5.3.2. Fragmenting the computation 
It seems more promising and in perfect coherence with our concept of fragmentation, to 
look at multiparty computation ([Yao 82]) and investigate the scalability question in the light of 
new hardware powerful platforms such as GPUs, Teralab, or multicore machines. The European 
H2020 ECRYPT project [Archer…15b] is suggesting this research direction. 
6. Selective fragmentation, selective encryption 
6.1. Introduction to selective encryption 
Traditional standard encryption systems are commonly used to protect data (e.g. DES, 
3DES, or its successor AES, etc.). However, it is argued (for instance, in [Massoudi…08a]) that 
these encryption systems, which have been originally developed for text data are less suitable for 
securing images mainly because they consist in putting in the whole image data into a standard 
encryption system without considering its specific nature. One issue [Krikor…09] is that all 
symbols in the content are of equal importance are argued non optimal for securing images. 
Another issue which will be addressed in this report is with performance. Full encryption 
algorithms can be time consuming once the end-user requires speed with regard to the protecting 
process while disposing of limited calculation resources environment like the ones available in a 
laptop. We could observe by experimentation that encryption and decryption processing of a 
bitmap image on a laptop causes non-negligible overhead.  It is therefore important to understand 
how to speed up this processing. Many methods have been proposed and developed in the past 
years (for instance [Ziedan…03]). Using weaker encryption algorithms or sequential 
implementation of selective encryption either have a lower security level or have poor CPU 
performance. 
 
Other works are proposing other methods for securing images, in particular methods 
called selective encryptions (SE) which are the focus of this work. SE consists in applying 
encryption to a subset of the original content with or without a preprocessing step. The general 
approach described in Figure 5 :  General concept of selective encryption.Figure 5 is to separate the 
image content into two parts or fragments. The first fragment is to be confidential and will be 
encrypted. The main goal of SE methods is to reduce the amount of data to be encrypted and take 
as little storage as possible while achieving a required level of security. The tradeoff is to make 
the confidential fragment as small as possible in order to reduce processing time while keeping 
the image secure enough to comply with the requirements of a given specific use case. It is the 
task of the preprocessing step (in Figure 2) to resolve this tradeoff and separate the image in two 
fragments.  
In this first experiment, information theory is used to separate and reduce the amount of 
data that needs to be protected and encrypted. 
In order to understand which part of the image will be encrypted, we have to transform the 
image. First, we used a Fast Fourier Transform algorithm, then a Discrete Cosine Transform 
algorithm (DTC) to get the frequency domain distribution of the data. We can then easily do 
fragmentation by judging which part is more important. Then different encryption methods to 
different parts of data can be applied according to their level of criticality. It turns out that the 
DCT is a reasonable balance of optimality of the input decorrelation (approaching the Karhunen-
Loève transform) and the computational complexity. 
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The second fragment is intended to be public and unencrypted as such, this fragment should 
not be sufficient to reveal or restore the full information. Moreover, it is intended to take most of 
storage space. 
 
Figure 5 :  General concept of selective encryption. 
For uncompressed images like bitmaps, the most important visual characteristics of an image 
are to be found in the low frequencies while details are situated in the higher frequencies. Studies 
on HVS (Human Visual System) have confirmed that human are more sensitive to lower 
frequencies than to higher ones [Puech…05]. This is why most SEs select and encrypt low 
frequencies in the confidential fragment rather than high frequencies. However, it is known that 
image sharp details reside in high frequencies; this means that sometimes, the public fragment 
can unveil information. We will discuss this point later since it led us to define a new design for 
SE with a strong level of protection. 
There exist methods to selectively encrypt values in frequency domain [Krikor…09] to protect 
bitmap images. However, although providing a good level of protection, these methods actually 
suffer from performance issues, a major impediment which made SE difficult to use. These 
performance issues will be extensively addressed in this report. 
We are interested in image protection within limited calculation resources environments like 
desktops, laptops, or mobile devices such as latest tablets or even smartphones. In this work, 
bitmap files are initially stored on a laptop. Two new methods of selective encryption in the 
frequency domain are presented, called first level of protection and strong level of protection. 
They both use a GPU (Graphic Process Unit) to provide with the necessary acceleration, shifting 
the heavy computation burden from CPU to GPU. They aim at speeding up SE method by using 
calculation resources of both CPU and GPU available on a laptop.  
This report is including results of our paper presented at ISM’14 [Qiu…14] and describes a 
novel strong level of protection for selective encryption published in [Qiu…15]. 
In section 6.2, we discuss previous works on selective encryption methods and their 
performance issue. In section 6.3, we present the two designs of our method in particular, 
introducing a new design which provides a strong level of protection. In section 6.4, the usage of 
GPU for the computation of the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is discussed. Consideration on 
the accuracy of the computation is also addressed since it directly impacts the quality of the 
image reconstruction. In section 6.5, we describe parallel implementations and extensively 
discuss results by considering two different GPU architectures. In section 6.6, statistical 
calculation is processed to analyze the level of protection of our methods. We conclude in section 
6.7 by suggesting how selective encryption can be used to safely store public fragments in public 
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storage systems, then, we discuss a last hardware architecture point that influences 
implementation before hinting on future work.  
6.2. Related work & Performance issues 
6.2.1. Related work 
SE schemes have been described and discussed in several previous works [Uhl…05], 
[Khashan…14], or [Massoudi…08a]. In their book, [Uhl…05] are surveying image and video 
encryption paying little attention to selective encryption. It is suggested that this method can be 
used for light encryption. The most likely reason certainly is about performance. According to 
[Massoudi…08a] the ratio between the respective sizes of public and confidential fragments 
depends on the use case and its level of required protection. Various kinds of methods are 
adapted to protect different image formats (JPEG and so on) or different image contents. 
In [Massoudi…08b] selected bits of each byte are protected considering the image as a binary 
file. This kind of method works well for JPEG image protection because the JPEG image files 
contain DCT coefficients after quantization and Huffman coding. These coefficients vary in a 
large range of values: the DC coefficient and the first low frequency coefficients are much larger 
than the remaining frequency coefficients. These differences in coefficient values provide the 
basis for the selective encryption methods by selecting and protecting the most important values. 
However this method must be refined for uncompressed bitmaps since the selected confidential 
fragment could be too large. For instance, in [Munir 10], four most significant bits (MSBs) of 
each pixel which represent 50% of the original data volume are selected for encryption.  
There exist methods to directly protect images without a preprocessing step like in 
[Zhang…13], selectively encrypting some areas by using scalable shape context to locate the 
important character in a cartoon image. This method aims at protecting only the most valuable 
area in the image. The remaining public part will be left  plain therefore vulnerable. Moreover, 
the first step consisting in separating the two parts is time consuming and affects the overall 
performance. 
Images can be protected in the frequency domain by encrypting some selected coefficients 
after processing the DCT algorithm. In [Puech…05] a method applied to medical images consists 
of encrypting the sole DC coefficients. The DC coefficients in the DCT represent the average 
intensity of the DCT block which is critical from an energy viewpoint. As shown in [Puech…05], 
protecting the DC value can highly degrade the visual quality of image or even make an image 
totally unreadable. However, as pointed before [Uehara…06], DC coefficients can be recovered 
from the remaining coefficients. So protecting an uncompressed image in the frequency domain 
should not only protect the DC values but also some AC values as well like in [Krikor…09] and 
[Yuen…11]. 
According to our research, protecting the DC coefficient and the first five AC coefficients in a 
DCT 8×8 block can efficiently protect images in most cases as it degrades the remaining public 
fragment into an almost totally unreadable and unrecoverable image. However, some images may 
contain many sharp edges which are transformed into some significant high frequency values. If 
we just use the remaining coefficients to do a reverse DCT (ICDT), some parts of these images 
may still be restorable to a readable image. This is the reason why the number of AC coefficients 
belonging to the confidential fragment ought to be tunable along the desired level of protection.   
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Moreover, performing DCT in the preprocessing step in order to separate uncompressed 
images like bitmaps into two parts can suffer from too an expensive performance overhead which 
can make SE even slower than a full image encryption. It is therefore important to benchmark 
any SE implementation against a full image cipher like AES.  
6.2.2. Comparing AES and DCT implementations 
Very few papers discuss and show performance evaluation of SE algorithms implementation 
like in [Khashan…14] where full image encryption with AES is compared to author’s SE 
implementation. However, it is important to benchmark SE against a full image encryption with 
cipher like AES in order to understand their actual potential usability. The speed of standard 
block encryption algorithm today is actually very fast, e.g. the AES 128-bit can reach more than 
200MiB/s on a PC’s CPU [Dai 09]. Assuming AES 128-bit is the encryption algorithm used after 
a preprocessing of an SE algorithm, we can conclude that a SE implementation will have 
acceptable performance from a user point of view only if the select step is faster than AES 128-
bit. 
Moreover, as SE algorithms are based on the versatile nature of multimedia contents, a general 
rule to judge whether a SE algorithm provides with a good level of protection or not is difficult to 
define since we have seen that this kind of algorithm efficiency depends on the nature of the 
multimedia content which can be very versatile. We consider a SE algorithm as ‘usable’ if this 
algorithm meets both a suitable level of security with regard to the needs for the special use case 
it is supposed to address and a level of performance comparable or better than a full encryption 
algorithm (in this report, we use AES 128-bit as the standard encryption). Based on this 
definition, most of the SE algorithms using DCT 8×8 in the literature are actually ‘unusable’ as 
DCT 8×8 algorithm is not faster than AES running on the same CPU. We use two different CPUs 
to test this assumption: the speed of AES (in two modes: Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) and 
Cipher Feedback (CFB)) is compared to the speed of DCT 8×8. Table 2 shows that DCT 8x8 is 
around 45% slower than AES. 
 
Intel CPU AES/CBC 128-bit AES/CFB 128-bit DCT 8×8 
I7-3630QM 374 MiB/s 362 MiB/s 203 MiB/s 
I7-4770K 494MiB/s 480 MiB/s 267 MiB/s 
Table 2 : Benchmark of AES 128-bit and DCT 8×8 on current CPUs. 
In order to speed up computation of DCT and make SE ‘usable’, we proposed in [Qiu…14] to 
use a GPU (Graphic Process Unit) as an accelerator. This kind of processor exists today in many 
laptops, desktops, tablets or even smartphones. GPUs offer hardware-level parallelism with 
hundreds or thousands of slim cores [Owens…08], [Han…10]. Their data-parallel execution 
model fits nicely with image transformation between time domain and frequency domain like 
DCT. AGPU acceleration for DCT 8×8 (DCT by block 8×8) is already shown in [Patel…09] or 
[Obukhov…08], however, not in the context of SE. Another reason for using GPU is their rapid 
density improvement which goes faster than usual CPU improvement [Han…10]. 
6.3. Designs 
Two designs of selective encryption in the frequency domain are described: a first level of 
protection (already described in [Qiu…14]) when speed is of the essence, and a more complex 
strong level of protection when a more global protection of the image is required. On the one 
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hand, our design proves that encrypting coefficients in frequency domain can efficiently protect 
images; on the other hand, this work shows that the data-parallel execution model of GPU fits 
nicely with the preprocessing step, DCT 8×8 which transforms images from spatial domain to 
frequency domain block by block. This feature will makes GPU provide with such a performance 
gain for selective encryption using DCT 8×8. 
The first level of protection is separating the vital piece of an image in a similar way than in 
[Krikor…09]. However, we found that the public fragment still may contain some visual 
characters that could result in unveiling important information. This issue has been the starting 
point to designing a strong level of protection following the same general concept as in Figure 5 
and preserving similar performance. 
6.3.1. First level of protection 
In our previous design [Qiu…14], we refined the “Preprocessing” step with more details (see 
Figure 6). First, the input data will be preprocessed using DCT 8×8. Then the results of the DCT 
8×8 which are the coefficients in the frequency domain will be fragmented into two parts 
according to the selection ratio with respect to the protection level which is desired. The 
encryption system will be used for the confidential part, Part 1. Part 2, the public one, is let plain. 
 
 
Figure 6 : Our design method for a first level of protection where part 2 is let plain. 
This method significantly reduces the need for the data to be fully encrypted and improve the 
output performance. The fragmentation step possesses selection ratio done in the frequency 
domain to increase or decrease the confidential part to be encrypted allowing the user to increase 
or decrease the desired level of protection. The fact that Part1 is small is based on information 
theory saying that: the distribution of the information energy is not uniform in the frequency 
domain. Most of the energy concentrates in the low frequency part which takes a small 
percentage of storage (Part1 is usually less than 10% of the total footprint). The ratio selection 
can be set by user input. However, the coefficients [0,0], [0,1], [1,0], [2,0], [1,1], [0,2] of the 
DCT 8×8 results cited from [Krikor…09] constitute the default selection and is recommended 
from experience. Selecting fewer coefficients for the private part would let a public part revealing 
too much. According to a non-uniformly distribution property of the energy contained in an 
image signal, the DC coefficient of the DCT result and another 5 AC coefficients are usually 
taking over 95% of the energy. This was confirmed by testing multiple images.  
This protection method will erase most important visual characters from an image (like 
people’s face). It is recommended if for instance, the user’s target is to protect attackers from 
knowing who is in the image. More generally, this first level of protection is good for soft 
encryption when high performance is required at the same time. In Figure 7, we select two 
original images (a) and protected results (b).  
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Figure 7 : Original image (a), images where the low frequency domain is padded with zeros (b) then with 
random numbers (c), and strong level of protection (d) 
6.3.2. Strong level of protection 
As said in introduction section 5, the level of protection depends on the nature of the content 
itself. High frequency coefficients sometimes may reveal some piece of the original image, since 
an image may contain some sharp edges or clear details. If we put random values in the low 
frequency domain and DC value, details like sharp edges of the original image will be enhanced 
(random numbers will enhance the correlation of the remaining DCT coefficients) and can reveal 
details as shown in Figure 7 (c).  
For some user cases, this kind of protection would not meet requirements. For example, if the 
content of an image is sensitive and requires a high level of protection, the high frequency 
coefficients need to be protected as well in order to prevent any visual elements to be unveiled. 
What must be noticed here is that performance for the whole selective encryption would indeed 
become worse than the full encryption if the same encryption method had to be used for the high 
frequency coefficients. 
Hence, the slightly more complex design in Figure 8 where Part 1 which contains selected low 
frequencies is used to generate a key to build up a light and fast protection for the high frequency 
part. In this work, the key generation step uses the SHA-512 function [NIST 02] to get a unique 
fixed-length string (512 bits long) from the 6 selected coefficients (Part 1 in Figure 8). The SHA-
512 function has a feature that can generate two different and unpredicted results even only one 
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bit of the input string is different. This feature will guarantee that the 512 bit string cannot be 
predicted even adjacent 8×8 blocks of an image can be very similar. Because the block we 
processed is 8×8, the reverse DCT result of the rest DCT coefficients padded with zero contains 
64 pixels storing in byte which is exactly 512 bits. The XOR step can protect every pixel block 
by block. 
 
 
Figure 8 : Design to enhance the protection level. 
As shown in Figure 7(d), the XOR pixel by pixel will thoroughly blur any visual characters 
and generates an almost uniform grey image. Section 6.6 will discuss this point from a statistical 
point of view. 
6.4. Two key implementation choices 
Before going further, we feel of paramount importance to focus in this section on DCT 
implementation, since, as seen in Table 2, AES implementations on a CPU is much faster than 
DCT. Here, the idea is to use a general purpose GPU for processing DCT. We also verify in this 
section that our implementation will be lossless (affecting the quality of the image reconstruction) 
and that the increase in memory due to this processing is particularly reasonable.  
6.4.1. GPU architectures 
    Commodity graphics processing units (GPUs) have rapidly evolved to become high 
performance accelerators for computing. Over the past few years, the GPU has evolved from a 
fixed-function special-purpose processor into a full-fledged parallel programmable processor 
with additional fixed-function special-purpose functionality [Owens…08]. The modern GPU is 
not only a powerful graphics engine but also designed as a general purpose engine with a large 
number of processor cores [Ryoo…08].  
As indicated in [Ryoo…08], the NVIDIA CUDA programming model [Nvidia 15] was created 
as an inexpensive, highly parallel system available to a continuously larger community of 
application developers. In this model, the system consists of a host that is a traditional CPU and 
one or more computing devices that are massively data-parallel coprocessors. Each CUDA device 
processor supports the Single-Program Multiple-Data (SPMD) model [Atallah…10], widely 
available in parallel processing systems, where all concurrent threads are based on the same code, 
although they may not follow exactly the same path of execution. All threads share the same 
global address space. 
Let us notice that according to [Gregg…11], the calculation ability of GPUs varies a lot due to 
their architecture and configuration differences (particularly in terms of numbers of cores). In 
their paper, they show that the Geforce GTX 480 card runs a sort application more than 10 times 
faster than a 330M card.  
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This is why we used two different GPUs to implement and evaluate our design. The first one is 
an usual laptop GPU Nvidia Nvs 5200M with a compute capability version 2.1 and the second 
one is a high performance desktop GPU Nvidia Geforce GTX 780 with a compute capability 
version 3.5 which provides the board with a more efficient memory management. In Table 3, we 
compare the two GPUs used in our implementations with two of the GPUs used by [Gregg…11] 
(Geforce GTX 480, a desktop GPU and 330M, an old laptop GPU). We can observe the 
progression particularly in terms of number of cores. We will come back on this point in our 
conclusion in section 6.7. 
 
GPU Type CUDA Cores 
Memory 
(MB) 
Clock 
(MHz) 
Memory Width 
Nvs 330M 48 256 1265 128-bit 
Nvs 5200M 96 1024 1344 64-bit 
Geforce GTX 480 480 1024 1401 320-bit 
Geforce GTX 780 2304 3072 941 384-bit 
Table 3 : Detail information of GPUs used in our work and by Gregg & Hazelwood (2011). 
6.4.2. DCT acceleration on GPU 
The DCT is a mathematical transformation first introduced in [Ahmed…74] that takes a signal 
and transforms it from spatial domain into frequency domain. We used the DCT optimized 
algorithm from the Nvidia technical report [Obukhov…08]. According to this report, an 
important feature called separability is used to make 2D DCT calculated by multiplication of 
vertically oriented 1D basis with their horizontal representations which fits well with the GPU 
parallelized hardware architecture.  
According to [Patel…09], the DCT 8×8 are implemented by using matrix multiplication which 
can be easily used by GPU acceleration. In [Huynh-Thu…08], it is reported that DCT 8×8 
computation can be accelerated by a factor 10 to 25. In Table 4, we compare the acceleration for 
DCT 8x8 on our own two computers, a laptop with the 5200M GPU, an Intel I-7 3630QM 
2.4GHz CPU and a desktop with the GTX 780 GPU, an Intel I7-4770K 3.5GHz CPU. This time, 
we can observe that DCT 8×8 is accelerated by a factor 10 to 75 with small variations when the 
image size varies. This shows how fast GPU architectures are progressing in comparison with 
CPU. 
 
Image size (in pixel) 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800 
Laptop CPU time 3.78ms 9.24ms 39.4ms 108.4ms 
Laptop GPU time 0.41ms 0.79ms 3.67ms 9.98ms 
Performance gain 9.2 11.7 10.7 10.8 
Desktop CPU time 2.88ms 7.0ms 29.9ms 82.4ms 
Desktop GPU time 0.04ms 0.09ms 0.41ms 1.12ms 
Performance gain 72 77.8 72.3 73.6 
Table 4 : DCT 8×8 acceleration for CPU and GPU along various image sizes 
From this test, we see that CPUs on a laptop and desktop computer are not that different as the 
performance of CPUs mainly account on the factors like main frequency and caches. For the 
same generation of Intel CPU, the performance is actually quite similar compared with the huge 
difference of the GPU performance which directly rely on the amount of the CUDA cores (could 
vary from 100 to 2300). Also, DCT 8×8 on GPU can run more than 70 times faster on the 
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desktop than on the laptop. This kind of acceleration for DCT 8×8 greatly changes and broadens 
the scope of selective encryption applications for bitmap images. 
6.4.3. Storage space and numeric precision 
There is a classic tradeoff between the memory occupation (in terms of both footprint and 
storage space) and numeric precision when it comes to handling floating point numbers with high 
precision. A similar tradeoff occurs with DCT computation. Each pixel in bitmap files is usually 
stored as an 8-bit integer (two more bytes are used for ‘Highcolor’ and two additional bytes are 
used for ‘Truecolor’). During the DCT computation, these integers are transformed into floating 
point 32 bits numbers increasing the footprint by a factor 4. At the end of the computation, 
numbers are turned back to integer and this is repeated during the computation of IDCT. These 
changes of numeric data type can involve truncation and generate image distortion or loss of 
information. This question seems to have been ignored in previous works about selective 
encryption using DCT like [Krikor…09], [Puech…05], or [Pareek…06]. 
In order to measure possible distortion or information loss in image processing, authors usually 
use Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) [Huynh-Thu…08].  
In our implementation, since DC coefficients are bounded by 2040, we used an 11-bit storage 
space. For AC coefficients, we have two sizes: the first one (called 11-bit storage in Figure 9(b) 
and Table 5) is using 11 bits with the first bit for the sign and the other 10 bits for the value (10-
bit can store integers from 0 to 1023). The second size is using 8 bits (called 8-bit storage in 
Figure 9 (c) and Table 5) with a similar convention: the first bit for the sign, the other bits for the 
values (up to 102). The two storage methods are designed for different requirements of images 
quality. 
If we take back one of the images of Figure 7 as our original image in Figure 9(a), we can 
observe the respective visual effects of using the 11-bit storage vs using an 8-bit storage in Figure 
9(b) and Figure 9(c) respectively. 
 
 
Figure 9 : PSNR and visual effect of different storage methods. 
Image size (in pixel) 11-bit storage 8-bit storage 
256×256 Infinite 51.74 
512×512 Infinite 51.82 
1024×768 Infinite 51.76 
1600×1200 Infinite 51.72 
3240×2592 Infinite 51.85 
4800×4800 Infinite 51.87 
Table 5 : PSNR for the selective encryption of different image sizes. 
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Table 5 provides the PSNR calculated for different image sizes for the 11-bit storage and the 8-
bit storage. It is usually admitted that PSNRs of 50 result in almost identical images. When the 
PSNR is infinite, the two images are said identical [Huynh-Thu…08]. 
The extra storage space of 8-bit storage method is 5/64 +11/8/64= 9.96% (DC takes 11 bits and 
AC takes 8 bits) of the original image. However, extra storage space of 11-bit storage space is 
11×6/64/8 = 12.9% of the original image. In this work, the 11-bit storage method is used as 
default; as pointed out in Table 5, this choice is making our DCT implementation virtually 
lossless for a wide array of image sizes. We will progress one more step (in sections 6.8 and 6.9) 
in this research of losslessness (aka integrity) by using DWT instead of DCT. 
6.5. Implementation and Evaluation 
In this section, we mainly discuss the implementation decision of allocating calculation tasks 
to GPU or to CPU. Then, we evaluate performance considering our two different hardware 
platforms: a laptop with limited computing capacity GPU and a desktop with a powerful GPU. 
Performances were so different that they led to different implementation decisions. 
6.5.1. Allocation implementation decision regarding the laptop scenario 
   This implementation described in Figure 10 was already shown in our previous 
published work [Qiu…14]. The image data will be first copied into GPU memory where it will be 
fragmented after DCT 8×8 preprocessing. Then, the selected coefficients which are considered as 
the important part will be transferred to host memory and encrypted using AES 128-bit by CPU. 
In parallel, the rest of the DCT coefficients will be padded with zeros and transformed by IDCT 
8×8 algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 10 : Process steps for first level of protection. 
 
The total run time depends on a race between CPU and GPU. The time spent using the GPU is 
greater than the time spent using the CPU as shown in the first rows of Table 6 and illustrated by 
Figure 11 where it can be observed that the CPU is idle most of the time. 
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This design based on the laptop hardware configuration works well for a series of images in 
the same format (bitmap) as input because of the parallel computation between the GPU and the 
CPU. As GPU are calculating the DCT 8×8 and IDCT 8×8 of each input image, the CPU is 
encrypting the selected confidential parts (data amounting to less than 10% of the original image) 
in parallel. The total run time depends on which processor is slower. The resulting flow of 
operations is shown in Figure 11 for two images I1 and I2. 
 
 
Figure 11 : Time overlay design for multiple bitmap images as series input. 
 
In fact, as long as the encryption run time on CPU for part I1 is less than the total time of 
period 2 for I1 and period 3 for I2 as shown in Figure 11, this implementation decision of overlay 
will work perfectly which makes it well adapted for the strong level of protection implementation 
shown in Figure 12 as well. As shown in the last row of Table 6, the time consumed by SHA-512 
/1024 algorithm on CPU can still be covered by the time consumed on GPU which makes this 
strong level of protection implementation have the same performance on a laptop as the first level 
of protection.  
 
 
 
Figure 12 : Process steps for strong level of protection. 
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Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800 
GPU time (DCT) 0.41ms 0.79ms 3.67ms 9.98ms 
CPU time (AES) 0.19ms 0.47ms 2.05ms 5.87ms 
CPU time  
(SHA-512) 
0.29ms 0.73ms 2.8ms 7.69ms 
Table 6 : DCT time on GPU and AES time on CPU of the laptop. 
The complete performance evaluation is shown in the third row of Table 7. The total runtime is 
not exactly twice the DCT runtime on GPU because DCT and IDCT are asymmetric and some 
coefficients are selected and padded with zeros. Our evaluation shows that the total runtime is 
over 1.1GB/s.  
As shown by [Li…12] and [Gervasi…10], GPUs can accelerate AES computation. 
However, as shown in Table 2 and Table 3, GPU calculation capacity varies widely according to 
their architecture. In Table 7, performances of full image encryption using AES on CPU or on 
GPU are compared with our SE method. It is worth pointing out that due to limitation of the GPU 
computation capability on laptop, the AES on GPU is slower than on CPU. 
 
Image Size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800 
AES on GPU  5.5ms 13.5ms 59.2ms 162.3ms 
AES on CPU 2.1ms 5.0ms 21.9ms 60.2ms 
SE on CPU + GPU 0.89ms 1.94ms 8.38ms 20.9ms 
Table 7 : Speed of AES on GPU, on CPU, our SE design on CPU + GPU on a laptop. 
6.5.2. Evaluations for first level protection on desktop 
Table 8 and Figure 13 are showing that GPUs on some desktops are so powerful that they are 
able to calculate DCT (or IDCT) faster than the CPU is able to compute AES for the selected part 
of the image. The huge potential calculation resources of modern GPU makes it possible to do all 
SE steps including DCT 8×8 and AES on GPU. According to [Li…12], AES speed can reach 
more than 50 Gbps on an Nvidia GPU of a desktop machine with CUDA implementation. Our 
implementation was able to reach almost 40 Gbps on our desktop GPU as shown in Table 9. In 
such a situation, the parallel implementation of Figure 11 is not suitable anymore and we are 
rather getting a scheme like in Figure 13 instead where the GPU is getting idle time, the CPU is 
fully used during the period 2 and is on the critical path.  
 
 
Figure 13 : Time overlay design on PC with a very powerful GPU. 
Actually on desktop scenario, the CPU speed in time period 2 (AES for selected data) is 
much slower than the GPU speed (IDCT for rest DCT coefficients). In the desktop we used an 
Nvidia GeForce GTX 780 as a GPU and an Intel I7-4770K as a CPU (mentioned in previous 
section GPU acceleration). Table 8 shows performance for the period 2 of Figure 13. 
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Image Size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800 
Period 2 on GPU 0.04ms 0.09ms 0.41ms 1.12ms 
Period 2 on CPU 0.16ms 0.38ms 1.72ms 4.67ms 
Table 8 : Run time in period 2 on desktop GPU and CPU. 
 
We then move all calculations of SE including DCT and AES to GPU. This design 
makes GPU to work three steps for each input image: DCT for original image, AES for selected 
part and IDCT for the rest coefficients. And we list the evaluation for full encryptions on CPU 
and GPU to be compared with SE on CPU and GPU in Table 9. 
 
Image Size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800 
AES on desktop GPU  0.19ms 0.46ms 1.91ms 5.46ms 
AES on desktop CPU 1.56ms 3.8ms 16.6ms 45.5ms 
SE on GPU 0.10ms 0.21ms 1.01ms 2.76ms 
Table 9 : Speed of AES on CPU and GPU, our SE (first level of protection) on GPU. 
We can see that the SE we use is still faster than AES on either CPU or GPU. This 
improvement benefits from the design we discussed in last subsection that is move all the 
calculations of SE to GPU. Based on these implementations, we can see that using GPU as an 
accelerator for our SE algorithm is always a better choice compared with AES judged by the 
performance they have. 
6.5.3. Evaluations for strong level of  protection on desktop 
Regarding the strong level of protection, we have to determine where to perform the 
hash calculation. According to tests based on programs described in [Steube 2013], SHA-512 
performance on the desktop GPU, Nvidia GeForce GTX 780 is around 136 MH/s (meaning 136 
million hash calculations per second). We should notice that for each 8×8 block, there will be one 
hash calculation, so we can estimate the run time by SHA-512 as in Table 10. 
 
Image Size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800 
Time consumed by 
SHA-512 once per 8×8 
block  
0.09ms 0.22ms 0.96ms 2.65ms 
Table 10 : Speed of SHA-512 of once per 8×8 block on desktop GPU. 
The speed is much faster than SHA-512 CPU based implementation from (Dai 2009). 
Moreover, SHA-512 implementation on CPU is too slow to fit with the overlay design shown in 
Figure 13 in our desktop scenario. We conclude from this analysis that it will be more efficient to 
compute the hash calculation on GPU. At last, we provide with Table 11 a comparison between 
the strong level of protection and AES both developed on GPU. 
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Image Size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800 
AES on desktop GPU  0.19ms 0.46ms 1.91ms 5.46ms 
SE on GPU 0.19ms 0.43ms 1.97ms 5.41ms 
Table 11 : Evaluation of AES on GPU, our SE (strong level of protection) on GPU. 
Table 11 shows that the strong level of protection on desktop with a powerful GPU 
available, has about the same performance as AES 128-bit for different images sizes. In 
summary, the allocation of calculation tasks of DCT, HASH and AES depends on the calculation 
capacity of the GPU. In fact, we can observe through tables 2 and 3 that GPU architectures 
progress at a faster pace than CPU architectures. Therefore, architectural decisions taken for the 
desktop implementation should prevail over time as powerful GPUs will eventually become more 
affordable and be present in laptop as well. The laptop architecture should remain interesting for 
energy critical environment though. 
6.6. Protection evaluation by statistical analysis 
In this section, histograms and correlation coefficients computation are used to evaluate 
the quality of protection relatively to the strong level of protection. As pointed out before, our 
method will fragment the image into two (a confidential fragment to be stored locally or in a 
high-level security place, a public fragment to be stored in a public server) and use the strong 
protection method as default to protect images.  
It is well known that many ciphers have been successfully cryptanalyzed with the help 
of statistical analysis and several statistical attacks have been devised on them [Pareek…06]. To 
convince oneself of the robustness of our encryption method, two kinds of statistical analysis are 
performed by computing histograms then correlation coefficients for two adjacent pixels first in 
the original image of Figure 7(a) then in the corresponding encrypted public fragment of this 
original image. 
6.6.1. Histogram analysis 
  An image-histogram illustrates how pixels in an image are distributed by graphing the 
number of pixels intensity level. Figure 14 shows that the histograms of the cipher image are 
fairly uniform and significantly different from the respective histograms of the original image. 
This property guarantees that the cipher image will not provide any clue to be employed by any 
statistical cryptanalysis [Pareek…06]. 
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Figure 14 : Plain image and its histogram compared with cipher image and its histogram. 
6.6.2. Correlation coefficient analysis  
    According to [Wang …11], to test the correlation between two adjacent pixels, the 
following procedures are carried out. First, randomly select 10,000 pairs of two horizontally 
adjacent pixels from an image and then compute the correlation coefficients rxy of each pair using 
the following classic equations: 
   (   )   {(   ( ))(   ( ))} , 
    
   (   )
√ ( )√ ( )
   , 
where x and y are grey-level values of the two adjacent pixels in the image. Then, the 
same operations are performed along the vertical and the diagonal directions. As shown in Figure 
15, the correlation coefficients of the cipher-images are very small. 
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Figure 15 : Correlation of adjacent pixels in horizontal, vertical and diagonal direction. 
6.7. Conclusion relative to selective encryption using DCT 
In this work, we implemented two selective encryption methods both using DCT 8×8 
preprocessing and GPU acceleration. We defined a first level of protection which is a 
continuation of our previous work [Qiu…14] and a novel strong level of protection. The first 
level of protection implementation combines calculation resources from both CPU and GPU 
available on most PCs, tablets, or even smartphones today. It provides a very fast speed to 
perform selective encryption in the frequency domain for uncompressed images like bitmap. We 
have seen on Table 7 and Table 9 along an array of different image sizes that it runs between 2 
and 8 times faster than AES according to which GPU architecture is used. The strong level of 
protection addresses the issue with better protection for the public fragment left plain in the first 
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level of protection. The idea is to use a small number of high frequencies to rapidly encode the 
low frequencies of the public fragment; indeed, the strong level of protection implementation also 
uses the acceleration offered by the GPU. Table 7 shows that it is still about twice faster than 
AES’s on a laptop; and Table 11 shows that performances are comparable to AES’s with a 
powerful GPU as the one found on a desktop. By two different statistical analyses, it has been 
possible to show that this method offers a good level of protection. 
The separation of an image data into a public fragment and a confidential fragment can 
be used to address the issue with efficiently protecting large amount of bitmap images using but 
not completely trusting remote storage servers like a storage provider. We separate the original 
data as ‘the’ important confidential fragment to be stored locally and put the remaining data to a 
remote server for instance, in a cloud with the additional protection offered by the cloud provider. 
In doing so, we make the best usage of the local memory where we store only about 13 % of the 
image, depending on a tunable number of coefficients selected to constitute the confidential 
fragment. To perform one or the other of the two methods, we refined the implementation 
architecture using both the GPU and the CPU available on a PC and reach a level of performance 
up to about four times the performance of AES and never slower. 
Indeed, one has to realize that GPUs architectures as well as encryption algorithms are 
progressing at a fast pace. For instance, late in 2014, a new generation Nvidia Geforce series 
GPUs (http://www.nvidia.com/object/geforce_family.html) was released with more CUDA cores, 
higher clock frequency and wider memory bandwidth, improving effective speed by 40% 
compared to GPU for the desktop we used. We are convinced that performance for computing the 
DCT 8×8 and other algorithms benefiting from GPU like SHA-512 or even AES will still 
progress. As pointed out by [Gregg…11], the memory transfer between host and GPU memory 
could be a bottleneck due to the limitation of the PCIE (Peripheral Component Interconnect 
Express) bus connecting them (normally several GB/s). During this work, we have seen that 
unfortunately, this can influence the load to assign to the CPU vs. the GPU in order to obtain the 
best performance. This would suggest developing a smart adaptor to allocate the computation 
task according to the hardware architecture available. 
Nonetheless, our work is clearly showing that selective encryption can potentially 
become widely used for bitmap image protection since it now provides excellent processing time, 
a strong level of protection possibly fragmented in two separate storage space, a moderate 
increase of its total memory storage. In our opinion, selective encryption of an image must be 
considered as a step towards a more complex combination of encryption and fragmentation. We 
started to experiment with selective encryption for a bitmap image as described in 
[Massoudi…08a] or [Krikor…09]. 
6.8. Selective encryption using DWT 
In the previous sections, DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) is used to support 
fragmentation decision before performing encryption for image protection. As pointed out, 
although with a remarkable benchmark brought by the GPGPU, DCT cannot guarantee the 
losslessness due to conversions between integers and floating point numbers which will result in 
rounding errors. The rounding errors can be reduced by using more storage space but cannot be 
totally avoided. This problem makes DCT cannot provide the integrity required for dealing with 
other kinds of data. 
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Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [Burrus…98] is used in selective encryption 
[Gonçalves…15], [Sadourny…03], [Pommer…03] but most of the time, it is rather used as a 
standard compression step for formatting rather than as a preprocessing step for selecting in 
multimedia use cases. In our design, the Le Gall 5/3 filter is used as it has an important lossless 
property by mapping integers to integers. 
 
Benchmark or performance against full encryption is still needed.  In some use cases, the 
preprocessing step of SE can legitimately be ignored as SE and compression are integrated and 
that transform is used by both applications. They just do light weight protection within the 
compression or coding process like in MPEG4 or JPEG2000. However, our use case 
encompassing any kind of data will have to take into account the entire process when it comes to 
performance evaluation. This will lead us to implement DWT on a GPGPU to benefit from the 
acceleration supplied by the parallel architecture of a GPU. 
6.9.   Design and key architectural choices 
6.9.1. Discrete Wavelet Transform 
DWT is a signal processing technique for extracting information mostly used in 
compression standard such as JPEG2000 or MPEG-4. It can represent data by a set of coarse 
grain and detail values in different scales. Naturally, it is a one-dimensional transform. But it also 
can be used as a two-dimensional transform as applied in the horizontal and vertical directions. 
For the image case, this will generate four small images which each one is one quarter the size of 
the original image with one level transform: one with low resolution (LL), one with high vertical 
resolution and low horizontal resolution (HL), one with low vertical resolution and high 
horizontal resolution (LH), and one with all high resolution (HH). Then, the second level 
transform will only be done for the first quarter of the first level’s result which is called dyadic 
decomposition as shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
 
Figure 16 2-Level DWT generates two-dimensional coarse and detail values [Burrus...98]. 
To perform the forward DWT, a one-dimensional subband is decomposed into a set of 
low-pass samples and a set of high-pass samples. By using LeGall 5/3 filter [Burrus...98], no data 
will be altered due to numerical rounding. And the lifting-based filtering is used which updates 
odd sample values with a weighted sum of even sample values, and updating even sample with a 
weighted sum of odd sample values. The lifting-based filtering for the 5/3 analysis filter is 
achieved by using (1) and (2) below: 
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where xext is the extended input signal, y is the output signal and  indicates the largest integer 
not exceeding a. 
 
We chose a two-level DWT as illustrated in Figure 16. The selected coefficients to build 
the private fragment are the 2
nd
 LL which takes about 1/16 of the storage space and carries the 
basic elements (coarse information) of the original image. The reason of using two-level DWT is 
that the one-level DWT still has a large part (1/4 of the storage space) of LL coefficients to 
protect and any other level DWT makes the selected coefficients very few such that the 
remaining public fragment could unveils too much information. 
6.9.2. GPGPU 
In order to improve DWT performance and make good use of all the capabilities of a 
PC’s hardware, the General Purpose Graphic Processing Unit (GPGPU) with a CUDA (Compute 
Unified Device Architecture [Kirk 07]) support is utilized and greatly accelerates the 
computation of DWT. A CUDA algorithm performs the one level 2D DWT (2D Daubechies 9/7) 
in 45ms (without data transfer between GPU and host memory) on a 4096x4096 image using an 
Nvidia Tesla C870 which is about 20 times faster than a PC CPU of the same hardware 
generation. 
 
    As a GPU is designed to parallelize the calculation tasks on a hardware level [Kirk 
07], the DWT-2D on tiled 8 × 8 blocks fits better on a GPU than a CPU. In order to fully use the 
calculation resource of a PC, the CPU is also used for calculation depends on the allocation of 
different hardware platform. In our implementations, we used the same two different GPUs used 
with the SE based on DCT with characteristics described in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 12 Main characteristics of a laptop GPU and a desktop GPU 
Unlike traditional CPUs which have only several powerful physical cores (normally 4 or 
8 on a Intel CPU for PC) that allows only limited number of threads in parallel physically, a 
GPGPU could contain hundreds even thousands of threads execution physically in the same time. 
The most commonly used example is the CUDA architecture from Nvidia [Kirk 07]. However, 
the GPGPU calculation capacity has a phenomenal growth in recently years. The Nvidia Nvs 
5200M GPU is a low-end GPU on a laptop with only 96 CUDA cores and 1GB GPU memory 
while the GeFroce gtx 780 GPU is a high-end GPU released in 2014 with 2304 CUDA cores and 
3GB GPU memory. The calculation capacity between the two GPUs have a huge difference 
which the GeForce gtx 780 is about 10 times faster on Hash (evaluated by [Steube 13]) and DWT 
calculation tasks than Nvs 5200M shown in Table 13. 
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Table 13 Hash and DWT 
6.9.3. Design of SE method for arbitrary nature of data 
In our design, as shown in Figure 17, in order to deal with sizable input data it is being 
proposed to cut into several chunks of the same given size 2D matrix (e.g. seen as a 512 × 512 or 
1024 × 1024 pixels gray color image which is chosen to accommodate further transformation or 
the hardware platform architecture). Then every chunk (Di) goes to the SE process to generate 
two fragments: the private fragments DiA and the public ones DiB. Then the DiA parts go to   a 
local machine under the user’s control and the DiB parts may be transmitted to the public area 
like a public cloud with no fear of an attack. 
 
 
Figure 17 SE General method of processing large amount of data.  
The main idea is to consider every chunk Di as a matrix and be treated as such by the SE 
process. That is to say any kind of data can be seen as a matrix by considering every byte of data 
as a pixel to form a bitmap gray scale image. Then every chunk Di is simply processed using the 
SE method block by block with block size 8x8 as shown in Figure 18. The block size chosen can 
be changed according to the size of the original data. This tiling step is used for fitting with the 
GPGPU architecture (which will be mentioned later in this paper). 
 
 
 
Figure 18 SE for the single 8x8 block of one image. 
The first step for the 8×8 block is to perform the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). In 
our work, two successive levels of the DWT are performed so the low frequency coefficients 
which are considered as the most important part (level 1 coefficients in Figure 18) and will be 
protected by AES-128 bit take only k out of 64 coefficients (with k = 4 in our implementation) 
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but carry most of the original frequency feature. Then the level 1 coefficients will generate a bit 
sequence with a length of 256 to protect the level 2 coefficients (the rest coefficients of 2nd level 
DWT) by performing a XOR operation also with the AES key and IV (Initial Vector). The SHA-
256 is used here to generate very different 256-bit sequence even when the selected coefficients 
of the neighbor blocks are very similar. These two parts of coefficients are considered as private 
and should be stored in a trusted area (locally in our scenario). In our design, however, the code is 
structured such that another cipher algorithm can easily replace AES-128 if need be. Of course, if 
this machine was to be considered as a trusted area then any kind of protection for the selected 
coefficients including no protection would do. Then the level 2 coefficients will be used to 
generate a bit sequence with a length 512 using SHA-512 also with AES key and IV to protect 
the level 3 coefficients (rest DWT coefficients) by performing a XOR operation also with AES 
key and IV. As long as the low frequency coefficients of DWT represent the basic elements of an 
image, the protected most part of the high frequency coefficients can be stored on public clouds 
without any information leak. 
6.9.4. Numerical precision and storage space usage 
The preprocessing step used to separate data for the SE, the data before and after the 
preprocessing step could be very different. This could lead to the difference of the storage space 
usage or rounding errors caused by conversions between integers and floating point numbers. In 
[Guan…05], the authors claim all variables are declared as type double with a bit-length of 64 
bits. This is unfair if the input data are stored as integers especially int type with a bit-length of 8 
bits as the storage of the results will require 8 times more storage space compared with original 
data. In [Qiu…15], we described how to optimize integer representation but still could not avoid 
possible rounding errors caused by the calculation of DCT. 
 
In this section, the preprocessing step is the DWT based on LeGall 5/3 filter which is 
designed to be an integer-to-integer map, such that the DWT is lossless. As a result, on one hand, 
any rounding error can be avoided; on the other hand, the extra storage space usage caused by the 
int to float conversion does not exist. The only possible extra storage usage could be caused by 
the different value range of the input 8-bit int and the output int coefficients. And the output 
value range can be calculated as long as the input values are always stored Byte by Byte, the 
input value range (seen as unsigned value) is from 0 to 255 which can be considered as from -128 
to +127 (the range is seen as from -128 to +128 during the following calculation). Then the 
storage methods can be designed according to the value range distribution. 
 
The first level DWT-2D transform is actually calculated by twice DWT-1D transforms 
(equation (1) and (2)) on the 8x8 block in horizontal and vertical directions sequentially. The first 
horizontal transform generates two sub-matrices which are 1
st
L and 1
st
H that take each half of the 
result matrix horizontally. The vertical transform is done on each of the two sub-matrices which 
generates four sub-matrices like in Fig. 4 (1
st
LL, 1
st
HL, 1
st
LH, 1
st
HH).  
 
In the first horizontal transform, the range for 1stH is -255 to +255 (double the range of 
input) and the range for the 1stL is -192 to +192 (1.5 times of the input range). Then the 
transform in vertical direction, which is transform of the 1stL and 1stH blocks respectively, gets 
the following results: 1stHH is from −511 to +511 and the range for 1stLH is from −384 to +384. 
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All the coefficients in the three sub-matrices of first level DWT- 2D transform can be stored 
using 10-bits storage space. 
 
The value range of second level DWT-2D coefficients are generated by the same two 
direction DWT-1D transform of the 1
st
LL submatrices coefficients. Range of the second level 
DWT coefficients can be estimated by simplifying the equations (1) and (2) and then directly get 
results from calculating final formula of each elements in the four submatrices in Figure 18 
(2
nd
LL, 2
nd
HL, 2
nd
LH, 2
nd
HH). And the max values and min values for each of the value 
estimated are shown in the following matrices. And the storage method for the second level 
DWT-2D coefficients is: 11-bits for each of the lower left corner four coefficients and 10-bits for 
rest of the coefficients. 
 
 
As pointed out in Figure 18, the confidential fragment we selected are two levels of 
coefficients which is the four submatrices (2
nd
LL, 2
nd
HL, 2
nd
LH, 2
nd
HH) and the 2
nd
LL is the 
level 1 coefficients. The storage environments for the three levels of coefficients could be 
flexible. If the level 1 and 2 are kept local and only level 3 coefficients are stored in clouds, the 
avalanche effect [Kirk 07] can be avoided (This is the design we chose to evaluated in this 
paper). However, if the channel is reliable and transmission mistakes are rarely to see, the level 2 
coefficients can also be put on clouds without leaking any information about the level 3 
coefficients so the storage locally is very little. The confidential fragment will take 164-bits 
storage in total (40-bits for level 1 and 124-bits for level 2) and the protected and public fragment 
takes 480-bits. The total storage space usage is 644-bits at least which is about 26% more than 
original but the most part can be stored on clouds without leaks and the important part is at most 
32% according to the stronger storage design.  
 
In summary, the preprocessing step is the DWT-2D based on LeGall 5/3 filter which is 
designed to be an integer-to-integer map, such that the DWT is lossless. As a result, on one hand, 
any rounding error can be avoided; on the other hand, the extra storage space usage caused by the 
int to float conversion does not exist. Moreover, in our design, we consider any kind of data type 
as int with bit-length of 8 bits. That is to say, no matter what kind of original data type it is, we 
process the data by reading byte seat a time and deal with it as an 8-bit integer. Then the input 
bytes will form an "image" (2-D matrix) of a configurable size ready for the whole SE process. In 
this process, the numerical data type of variables involved in DWT computation is carefully 
designed such that it can provide integrity for any kind of input data. 
6.10.    Security Analysis 
 
A secure encryption algorithm ought to resist existing powerful attacks [Nyberg…95], 
[Cho…11]. In this section, different security tests on the proposed scheme are performed to 
establish its high level of security. Indeed, as the protected data is divided into two parts and each 
one are protected. The first private part, which has a small size, is encrypted by AES-128 and 
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stored locally in our scenario, while the second public one is stored on the cloud while permits to 
reduce the stored overhead locally and provide protection for the data stored in clouds.  
 
The basic assumption is the selected private part of data is secure by using AES-128 
(also, it is easy to replace AES-128 with any other encryption algorithms as in Figure 18), so the 
security property of this part is not analyzed in this section. To validate the safe employment 
(robustness) of the proposed method, the public part which can be stored on clouds in our use 
case is analyzed in terms of cryptographic performance to verify if it reaches the required 
cryptographic performance.  
 
In the following, we present some of the figures for the security analysis but all 
statistical results can be found in Table 14. Moreover, as long as both image and text file are used 
as test examples, some criteria are just suit for images while not text files; some criteria are not 
applied for text files as input. 
6.10.1. Statistical Analysis 
Immunity against statistical attack requires that the cipher must reach a high level of 
randomness. To validate the robustness of this cipher, different statistical security tests are 
applied such as uniformity of encrypted image and independence between plain and encrypted 
images. 
Table 14 : Statistical results of sensitivity for interesting part (stored locally) for Lenna image (a) and a 
random text (b) 
6.10.2. Uniformity Analysis 
The encrypted data should possess certain random properties such as the uniformity, 
which is essential to resist against frequency attacks. Therefore, the PDF (Probability Density 
Function) of the encrypted data should be uniform. This means that each symbol has an 
occurrence probability close to 1/n, where n is the number of symbols (1 256 = 0.039 in byte 
level). We start by analyzing the image data and then text data to prove that the proposed method 
can attain the uniformity independently for its public part. 
The original plain image Lenna and its corresponding PDF are shown in Figure 19-(a), 
(b). While, in Figure 19-(c), (d), the corresponding cipher image that is stored in cloud (c) to their 
corresponding PDF (d) is shown, respectively. It can be observed that the PDF of the encrypted 
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images using the proposed scheme is close to uniform distribution since the probability of 
different symbols is close to 0.039. 
Also, in Figure 20, the byte representation of an original chosen text file is presented in (a) 
and its corresponding PDF in (b) in addition to its corresponding encrypted text byte 
representation that is stored in cloud (c) and with its corresponding PDF (d). The result indicates 
that the encrypted text file also possesses a uniform distribution. From these results, we have 
shown that the distribution of encrypted data tends to the uniform one no matter of the input data 
type. Moreover, to validate this result, an entropy test is realized in the sub-matrix level of size 
8×8 (same size as the plain-text input block). 
 
 
Figure 19 (a) Original image, (b) PDF of the original image, (c) encrypted image, (d) PDF of the encrypted 
image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 (a) Original text byte representation, (b) its corresponding PDF, (c) Encrypted text stored in 
cloud, (d) its PDF corresponding representation 
6.10.3.  Information Entropy Analysis 
The information entropy of a data sequence M is a parameter that measures the level of 
uncertainty in a random variable and it is expressed in bits, and is defined using the following 
equation (3): 
 
Where p(mi) represents the occurrence probability of the symbol mi and n is the total 
states of the information source. To the best of our knowledge, the related works applied the 
entropy test in the level of image. However, this is not significant. We propose to apply the 
entropy test in the level of sub-matrix with size h × h (same size of input and encrypted plain-text 
block). Indeed, each sub-matrix can be considered a truly random source with uniform 
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distribution if it has an entropy equal or close to log2(h
2
). The value of entropy close log2 (h
2
) is 
the desired value. 
 
The entropy analysis for the original and for the encrypted Lenna stored in cloud is 
shown in Figure 21-(a) for h = 8. These results indicate that the encrypted sub-matrices always 
have an entropy close to the desired value, which is 6 in case of h = 8. Also, the same test is 
applied for the text file shown in Figure 20-(a) and the result is shown in Figure 21-(b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21 Entropy analysis (for h= 8) for the sub-matrices of (a) original and encrypted images , of (b) 
text 
    Moreover, the average entropy for the encrypted Lenna image versus 1000 random secret keys 
is 5.766 and for the text file is 5.766 which are both very close to 6 (see H − E in Table 14) while 
are also very different from the original entropy (see H − O in Table 14). Therefore, the proposed 
cipher is secure against entropy attack in both image and text cases. 
6.10.4. Correlation test between the Original Data and the Public Fragment 
A low level of correlation between original and encrypted data is an important factor 
that allows validating their respective independence. Having a correlation coefficient close to 
zero means that the high degree of randomness is reached. The correlation coefficient rxy is 
calculated using the same method as in section 6.6.2. 
In this test, we also use image and text files as input for analyzing potential correlation. 
Indeed, the variation of coefficient correlation between original and encrypted matrices is 
obtained by applying 2-D correlation coefficient and the result is shown in Table 14 (see value 
distribution of ρ2 for image case and ρ for text case). The result indicates that the 2-D coefficient 
correlation varies in a small interval around 0. This means that low 2D-correlation coefficient is 
reached by employing the proposed cipher approach and consequently the independence between 
the original and encrypted matrices is statistically attained. 
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Additionally, to validate that spacial redundancy is removed for the encrypted image, the 
correlation between pixels of original and encrypted images are realized. This test selects 
randomly N = 4096 pairs of two adjacent pixels in horizontal, vertical and diagonal direction. The 
results are presented in  
 
Figure 22, for the original (a)-(c) and encrypted Lenna image (d)-(f) in horizontal, vertical 
and diagonal directions, respectively (same for text file from (h) to (m)). The result in this figure 
clearly indicates the high correlation between adjacent pixels in plain matrix input (correlation 
coefficient close to 1). While, for the ciphered matrix, the correlation coefficients become very 
low (close to 0) which clearly shows that the proposed scheme reduces severely the spatial 
redundancy. 
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Figure 22 Correlation distribution in adjacent pixels in the original image (a) horizontally, (b) vertically, (c) 
diagonally Correlation distribution in adjacent pixels in the encrypted image (d) horizontally, (e) vertically, (f) 
diagonally Correlation distribution in adjacent pixels in the original text (h) horizontally, (i) vertically, (j) diagonally 
Correlation distribution in adjacent pixels in the encrypted text (k) horizontally, (l) vertically, (m) diagonally 
Moreover, the variation of the correlation coefficient between adjacent pixels of encrypted 
Lenna image versus 1000 random keys are shown in Table 14 (ρ−h, ρ−d, ρ−v respectively. The 
results are close to 0, which confirms that spatial redundancy is eliminated and no detectable 
relation can be found in the encrypted matrix for both image and text case. Similar results are 
obtained using text file as input (see  
 
Figure 22 (h)-(m)). 
6.10.5.  Difference Between Plain and Ciphered Images 
The encrypted data must be as different as possible from the original data, at least 50% 
in a bit level comparison. The proposed scheme achieved a high value of difference before and 
after processing for any data format. For example, the plain image Lenna was tested and the 
result in Figure 23-(a) shows that 50% of bits is being changed between the encrypted and the plain 
image. Additionally, similar result is obtained for text file and statistical value is shown in Table 
14 (see value distribution of Dif for image case and text case). 
Additionally, in order to confirm this result, we applied the Normalized Mutual 
Information (NMI) between the original and encrypted matrices of 1000 random secret keys and 
the  results (in Figure 23-(b) for an image, in Table 14 for a text) are showing that NMI is always 
close to 0 (mean equal to 0.0193). Consequently, this strongly indicates that no meaningful 
information can be extracted from the encrypted data. 
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Figure 23  Difference (a) and MNI (b) between original image and encrypted image using 1000 random 
different keys 
6.10.6.  Sensitivity Test 
Differential attacks are based on studying the relation between two encrypted data 
resulting from a slight change, usually one different bit in the original plain image or in the key. 
A successful sensitivity test shows how much a slight change will affect the cipher data. In other 
words, the higher the ciphered data changes when slight change happens in input, the better 
sensitivity of the encryption algorithm is. Here, we analyze different types of sensitivity. 
  
For the Plain-text Sensitivity, it is designed that different Initial Vector (IV) is employed 
for each input matrix which leads to produce totally different cipher image for the same plain 
image. Therefore, the cipher has successfully met the avalanche effect but in a different manner 
and based on the key and IV sensitivity.  
Concerning the Key and Initial Vector Sensitivity tests, it is one of the most important 
tests and allows quantifying its sensitivity against any slight change in the secret key or in the 
initial vector. In fact, the proposed key derivation function is based on the mixed of secret key 
and an initial vector, which means that similar sensitivity performance should be reached. To 
study the key sensitivity, two secret keys are used: S K1 and S K2 that differ in only one random 
bit. The two plain-images are encrypted separately and the Hamming distance of the 
corresponding encrypted Lenna images C1 and C2 is computed and also for the chosen text file, 
and illustrated as Table 14 (see KS for both cases) versus 1000 tests.  
It is seen that the obtained values are always close to the optimal value (50 %) for the 
both input data. This indicates that the proposed method ensures high sensitivity against any tiny 
change in the secret key. Similar results are obtained for the IV sensitivity. 
6.10.7.  Visual Degradation 
This test is specific for image and video contents and allows quantifying the visual 
degradation reached by employing a cipher scheme. In fact, the degradation operated on the 
original image must be done in a way that the visual content presented in the ciphered image 
must not be recognized. Two parameters are usually studied to measure the encryption visual 
quality which are Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) [Hyunh…08] and Structural Similarity 
index (SSIM). 
PSNR is derived from the Mean Squared Error (MSE), while MSE represents the 
cumulative squared error between the original and encrypted images. A lower PSNR value 
indicates that there is a high difference between the original and the cipher images. 
The SSIM index is defined after the Human Visual System (HVS) has evolved so that we 
can extract the structural information from the scene. SSIM is in the interval [0,1]. A value of 0 
means that there is no correlation between the original and the cipher images, while a value close 
to 1 means that the two images are approximately the same. In this context, PSNR and SSIM are 
measured between the original and the encrypted Lenna images for 1000 different keys and 
corresponding value distribution presented in  
 
 
Figure 24, respectively. The mean PSNR value is 9.23 dB which validates that the proposed 
cipher provides a high difference between the original and the encrypted image. Also, the SSIM 
  
 
52 
 
 
 
value did not exceed 0.036, which means that a high and hard visual distortion is obtained using 
the proposed cipher algorithm. 
 
As a conclusion, the proposed cipher scheme ensures a hard visual degradation. This 
means that no useful visual information or structure about the original image could be revealed 
from the cipher image. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24 PSNR and SSIM variation between the original and the encrypted image using 1000 random different 
keys 
6.10.8.  Error propagation 
An important criteria that should be ensured for any cipher is the error propagation. The 
interference and noise in the transmission channel (or in the store system) might cause errors. Bit 
error means that a substitution of ’0’ bit into ’1’ bit or vice versa. This error may propagate and 
lead to the destruction of decrypting data, which is a big challenge since a trade-off between 
avalanche effect and error propagation are shown in [Massoudi…08a]. In this proposal, if a bit 
error takes place in the encrypted cipher sub-matrix, the error will propagate randomly only in its 
corresponding sub matrix and will not affect its consecutive corresponding decrypted sub-matrix. 
Moreover, as we presented before, in Figure 18, the Level 3 coefficients are the only part that 
transmits. This means the decrypting error could only happen when XOR the Hash results of 
Level 2 coefficients and protected Level 3 coefficients. The decrypting data will have 1 bit error 
if there is 1 bit error in the protected Level 3 coefficients during transmission. As a result, we can 
conclude that the proposed approach is efficient to overcome error propagation. 
6.10.9. Cryptanalysis Discussion: Resistance against the well-known types of 
attack 
In this part, typical cryptanalytic cases appearing in the literature are considered and a 
brief analysis of the proposed cipher against several cryptanalytic attacks is provided from a 
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cryptanalysis viewpoint. The proposed method is considered to be public and the cryptanalyst has 
complete knowledge to all steps but indeed no knowledge about the secret key and the dynamic 
initial vector (Kerkhoff’s principle). 
 
The strengthen of the proposed scheme against attacks is based on the dynamic key that 
produced in function of a secret key and a dynamic secret initial vector by applying a hash 
function (one way property) for each input plain-text. Indeed, it is very difficult for an attacker to 
recover the dynamic secret key that is changed for every input data. Therefore, the problem of 
single plaintext failure and accidental key disclosure is avoided by this scheme. Furthermore, 
differential and linear attacks would become ineffective. In fact, any change in any bit of the 
secret key or IV (public parameters) causes a significant difference in the produced encrypted 
image as seen in Table 14. Moreover, we apply a robust block cipher AES with a secret key length 
of 128, 192, or 256 bits, which is sufficiently large to make a brute-force attack utterly difficult. 
Hence, a sufficient secret key is used and as the difficulty of cipher-text-only attack is equal to 
one of the brute force attacks, it becomes impossible for a cipher-text-only attack to retrieve 
useful information from the public part in our scheme. Therefore, our method resists the cipher-
text attack. 
 
Toward resist the statistical attacks, the proposed approach achieves that the plain-text 
are changed in positions and values, which means that the confusion and diffusion properties are 
ensured in addition. An example is illustrated in Figure 25, where a 8×8 matrix of the original Lena 
image and its corresponding cipher one is illustrated by their values. This result demonstrates that 
all values are changed. Therefore, the randomness property is ensured and this consequently 
permits to prevent the reverse-attack algorithm. 
More importantly, the spatial redundancy between adjacent elements of input plain data 
are removed and a high randomness degree of the whole encrypted data are proved. Different 
statistical tests such as the entropy analysis, probability density function, correlation tests are 
applied to validate the independence and uniformity proprieties. Consequently, these results 
indicate that no useful information can be detected from the public part. This validates the 
robustness of the proposed approach and their high resistance to statistical attacks. 
Moreover, key sensitivity analysis demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed cipher 
scheme against related key attacks, while any change in any one bit of key provide a different 
(50%) encrypted data. 
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Figure 25 (a) 8x8 cropped plain image with its corresponding gray scale matrix, (b) its encrypted version  
 
6.11. Performance evaluations 
 
In this section, we evaluate performance of the whole protection process. As we are 
considering the allocation of the calculations on a PC platform, the hardware resource we have 
are a CPU and a GPGPU. However, the calculation capacity of GPGPU could be very different 
that changes the whole execution time of SE [Owens…08]. So the performance is evaluated in 
two typical use cases that are a laptop equipped with a low-end GPU and a desktop equipped with 
a high-end GPU. 
6.11.1.  Evaluation for all calculation tasks 
A key implementation decision   is to distribute the calculation tasks between the GPU 
and the CPU. As pointed out in Section 2.3.2, the DWT-2D, SHA-256 and SHA-512 can benefit 
from the GPU acceleration, so the design is based on the parallel execution of CPU with GPU 
while the GPU will take calculation tasks of DWT- 2D, SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the process 
while CPU takes AES-128 for only Level 1 coefficients. The initial plan for both low-end and 
high-end GPU cases is to keep the GPU busy and CPU would have idle time space available for 
other tasks (Figure 26). 
In the laptop, there are an Intel I7-3630QM CPU and an Nvidia Nvs 5200M GPU. For 
the desktop, we have an Intel I7-4770K CPU and an Nvidia Geforce gtx 780 GPU. In order to 
verify our initial plan and allocate the right calculation tasks to the right chip, we evaluate each of 
the tasks on laptop and desktop and results are shown in Table 15. For different size of input data 
chunk, the execution time of GPU for the second input data chunk can always overlap the 
execution time of CPU for the selected DWT-2D coefficients of the first input data chunk. 
 
From the two hardware environments, we evaluated, the overlay design in Figure 26 
works. And the speed of the whole SE process relies on how fast the GPU can process its 
calculation tasks on input data as long as there are many chunks as input. That is to say, in these 
two scenarios, the time consumed by GPU is evaluated as the benchmark for our SE method. The 
calculation speed evaluated for this laptop scenario is about 360 MB/s and for this desktop 
scenario is about 2.8-3.2GB/s. 
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Table 15 Performance evaluation for every calculation taks of SE for two different Hardware 
environments for different image sizes 
 
Figure 26 Load distribution between GPU and CPU processors 
6.11.2.  Discussion on performance 
We used two very different GPU architectures with contrasted characteristics (see Table 
12):  2304 CUDA cores for the desktop GPU to be compared with the 96 CUDA cores on the 
laptop GPU. These differences are sufficient to explain the differences in performance between 
the laptop and the desktop. As long as GPU architectures are rapidly evolving, the hardware 
configuration of a GPU may strongly influence software applications architectural choices 
necessary to derive the best possible code. This point could even invert the results of our 
evaluation since a large number of cores could very well favor the GPU calculation tasks that 
finally change the overlay design. Also as pointed by [Gregg…11], when a GPU calculation 
capacity is very high, bottleneck of the process is the memory transfer between the GPU memory 
and the host memory instead of calculation speed itself. 
 
Here we presented the comparison of the SE method with the traditional CPU-only 
AES-128 speed ([Dai 09]) in Figure 27. It is worth noticing that [Bogdanov…15] pointed out the 
CPU-only AES could also be very fast with the support of the New Instructions extension 
brought by Intel. This AES-NI could accelerate the AES on CPU for more than 5 times and 
achieve almost 3GB/s on a desktop CPU (shown in Figure 27). In short, as long as the GPU is 
evolving rapidly, the computation design could always change to achieve the best performance. 
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Figure 27 Time overlapping architecture of the implementation 
6.12. Conclusion relative to selective encryption using DWT 
In this paper, an efficient agnostic selective encryption algorithm was presented. It 
separates the input data into two fragments. A first fragment called private, contains most of the 
information within about 25% of the memory size of the original data. The separation 
preprocessing must be fast, guarantee integrity, and enable memory optimization at the same 
time. This is attained by employing the invertible DWT-2D 8 × 8 preprocessing implemented by 
using a GPU and that allows   accurately recovering the plain-text without any error. 
 
The proposed scheme can be applied to any kind of data and not only to multimedia 
contents at the difference of any SE method that we have been able to see in the current literature. 
The proposed approach employs the robust block cipher AES with counter mode to protect the 
interesting part that will be stored locally. In addition, the plaintext of the interesting part is 
hashed with a counter to produce a key-stream matrix. This matrix will then be employed to 
encrypt the non-interesting part by mixing it with the produced key-stream. The encrypted non-
interesting part will be transmitted to the cloud and according to the obtained results, no useful 
information can be detected, which ensures that the data confidentiality and the privacy of users. 
Moreover, the proposed scheme can be realized in parallel to permit the parallelism processing 
and consequently reduce latency. More important, we recommend employing GPU to reduce the 
overhead of applying the optimization DWT-2D operation. To validate that the proposed design 
can ensure the required goals, a benchmarking was realized between the proposed solution and a 
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full CPU on two different kinds of data. Several experimental and theoretical analysis were 
realized to prove the efficiency, robustness and resistance against error propagation. Therefore, 
the proposed solution can be considered as a good selective encryption algorithm candidate that 
can be applied for any system and for any kind of data.  
7. Non selective fragmentation of data into several fragments 
 
 Our analysis now focuses on textual data stored in distributed storage solutions 
exploiting data fragmentation and dispersion as a way of providing additional security. 
Today, data fragmentation is widely used for resilience and scalability purposes: for 
instance, it can be found in the RAID technology [Raid], as well as in clusters like Apache 
Hadoop [Hadoop]. However, the fact of dividing data into pieces and dispersing those pieces 
on multiple machines in order to constitute a considerable obstacle for an attacker is not 
yet widely spread. 
 Fragmentation for security can be found in a theoretical paper from late 70’s 
[Shamir 79] where it addresses the problem of secure storage and management of an 
encryption key. Then, a more architectural description can be found from the 80’s [Fray…86] 
with a design breaking sensitive data from non-confidential fragments and dispersing them on 
separate physical devices. During following decades, fragmentation idea was applied to relational 
database systems [Aggarwal…05], [Ciriani…10] and more recently, fragmentation was used in 
the context of the cloud technology [Bkakria…13], [Hudic…12], [Vimercati…13]. Today, we 
are facing new challenges along scalability and exposure: Petabytes of data are to be 
protected over large distributed systems of thousands of machines, which can at least 
partially, be public. 
 In this report, we propose to organize existing storage systems using fragmentation for 
security purpose into two groups. The first group addresses the need for archiving data structures 
on storage architecture without making any assumption about the type of data or about the kind 
of storage servers (they are all considered identical in term of trustworthiness). This group 
includes both academic and commercial solutions. In the second group, confidential data are 
stored on secured devices in contrary to non-sensitive data that can stay in public areas. We 
analyze both categories of systems in terms not only of security, but of memory occupation, 
resilience, key management, and performance (including latency). We conclude this section 
by discussing some fragmentation issues and recommendations 
7.1. Bitwise data fragmentation and dispersion 
 
 This section presents an overview of systems using data fragmentation and dispersion 
without any consideration for their structure or nature, their semantic, or their uneven level of 
confidentiality. They just consider data as a sequence of bits, this is why we qualified them of 
‘bitwise’.  
Table 16 and Table 17 summarize their most important features with regard to data 
dispersion: secrecy, key management, availability, integrity and recovery in case of loss of 
information, defragmentation processing, number of fragments sufficient for an attacker to 
recover data, and required storage space. The first three systems are based on secret splitting 
techniques and guarantee information-theoretic security: an attacker will not be able to find out 
  
 
58 
 
 
 
any information about a single fragment until he obtains the corresponding one-time pad for that 
fragment. Two commercials solutions, Cleversafe and Symform, are only computationally secure 
(it is possible to obtain some information about a fragment while having enough of time and 
computational resources), but significantly optimize the storage space by combining AES 
encryption [AES 01] with data dispersion. Most of these systems are dedicated to archiving or 
long-term storage. They are efficient for larger rather than smaller data objects. 
7.1.1. Encryption techniques used for dispersed storage 
 This subsection presents the most common ways of dividing data into fragments, 
which do not reveal any information until being regrouped. 
 Secret sharing schemes, also known as threshold schemes, fragment data of size d 
into n pieces of the same size d of the original data, in such a way that any k pieces are 
sufficient to recover the original information while k-1 are not. In contrary to standard 
encryption techniques, secret sharing schemes provide information-theoretic security and 
do not require key management. One of the most popular sharing schemes is the Shamir’s 
threshold scheme [Shamir 79] based on polynomial interpolation. Another scheme is the 
[Blakley 79] scheme relying on the fact that any n nonparallel (n-1)-dimensional 
hyperplanes intersect at a specific point. An XOR splitting is also a common and non-costly 
way of implementing secret sharing: to produce n fragments of the secret, n-1 random 
fragments are generated and one additional fragment is calculated, which XOR-ed with 
other fragments will give the secret back. As XOR splitting is a (n, n)-threshold scheme, it is 
not possible to recover the secret in case of loss of any fragment. However, because of their 
expensive memory consumption, secret sharing schemes are mainly used for protection of 
small sized data like encryption keys. In [Krawczyk 93], Krawczyk describes a storage 
efficient way of protecting information using a combination of the Shamir’s secret splitting 
and the Rabin’s dispersal algorithm [Rabin 89]. Rabin’s scheme breaks data of length L into 
n pieces, each of length L/m, so that every m pieces suffice for reconstruction of the whole 
data. It is usually used for fault-tolerant storage and information transmission.   
 In Krawczyk’s method, pieces of data are encrypted with a randomly generated key. 
Then, data is divided into n fragments using Rabin’s algorithm and Shamir’s threshold 
scheme is applied only for key protection purpose. A significant storage space saving was 
also achieved in [Parakh…10] – to reduce the size of fragments they applied redundancy to 
the Shamir’s algorithm. However, with gain in storage space both algorithms, Krawczyk’s, 
and Parakh and Kak’s, lost the information-theoretic security property: an attacker 
disposing of enough time and huge computational resources can deduce some information 
from fewer fragments than required for data reconstruction. 
7.1.2. Key management and storage space 
 Key management is one of the features presented in  
Table 16 and Table 17. More fragments can imply more keys to be stored and managed. 
In systems that leverage secret splitting as a way of providing secrecy one plaintext fragment 
corresponds to two or more encrypted fragments. As a consequence, storage space in such 
systems is at least twice as big as the initial data size. Key management in this situation consists 
in assembling the right pairs or groups of fragments. Cleversafe and Symform base their 
protection on the AES encryption performed on fragments of data. The first commercial system 
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comes with a so-called keyless solution, where the key is integrated in the data itself in an 
additional fragment. There is no need for key management: since once will obtain a sufficient 
number of fragments, he will be able to decrypt all of them. In Symform solution the key for each 
fragment is generated as a hash of the fragment itself. Keys are stored and managed inside a 
central trusted part of the cloud. 
7.1.3. Data recovery 
 The possibility of data reconstruction in case of loss of a part of the information extends 
the longevity of a storage system. All of the outlined solutions from  
Table 16 and Table 17 add some redundancy to countermeasure availability problems. 
Redundancy can be assured by a simple use of duplication of fragments, like in the case of 
POTSHARDS [Storer…09] and GridSharing [Subbiah…05], or by application of error correcting 
codes, which is the case of commercial solutions. The first way is more costly in terms of storage, 
but does not require complex calculation. Error correcting allows minimizing space on servers, 
but can be a burden for performance, especially in case of smaller data. 
 Another aspect that must be considered is the longevity of data while losing 
information about fragments location and order. Only POTSHARDS system addresses 
directly this problem by adding to fragments approximate pointers, which are references 
containing the possible location of other fragments of the same data. The architecture of 
remaining systems would allow a data recovery implying the cooperation of all of the 
storage nodes. 
7.2. Academic and Commercial System Descriptions 
7.2.1. PASIS 
 In 2000, the PASIS [Wylie…00] project adopted secret sharing for data protection in 
its implementation of a survivable storage system capable to handle storage nodes failures 
and malicious user activities. 
PASIS uses p-m-n threshold schemes to encode data before it is stored. Data is 
broken into n fragments such that any m of them allows data recovery and fewer than p 
reveal no information. For maximum efficiency, the choice of an appropriate threshold 
scheme is adapted to the specific data to be protected, especially to its size. Moreover, an 
over-requesting technique speeds up the performance of data retrieval. To overcome the 
problem of malicious clients, PASIS comes with a self-securing storage: storage nodes 
internally version all data and audit all requests, thus providing time to detect intrusions. 
Repair agents installed on storage nodes are in charge of rebuilding damaged data based on 
the change history. 
 In comparison to a conventional primary-backup system, PASIS achieves better 
confidentiality, availability, durability and integrity. Its weak points are an excessive 
amount of required storage, as well as a significantly higher latency. 
7.2.2. GridSharing 
 Another implementation of a distributed storage system comes from 2005 
[Subbiah…05]. GridSharing combines perfect sharing scheme with replication of secret’s 
fragments on different devices in order to build a fault-tolerant and secure distributed 
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system fulfilling confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements. According to the 
authors, choosing perfect sharing schemes for data protection evades problems connected 
with key management. 
 An interesting idea of fragments renewal for additional protection is raised. The 
renewal consists on a periodical replacement of existing data fragments with new ones. 
This way the attacker has a shorter time interval for collecting all of the fragments required 
for data recovery. Perfect sharing schemes (where all the fragments are required to 
reconstruct the data, like the XOR splitting method) allow the implementation of efficient 
share renewal procedures: changing stored fragments without previous data 
defragmentation. For imperfect sharing schemes, where the knowledge of fewer than the 
threshold numbers of fragments can provide some information, a renewal algorithm has 
not been developed to date. 
Table 16 
 Comparison of bitwise data  dispersion for academic storage systems. Blocks for  
compromise - number of fragments needed for data  recovery, b -number of Byzantine 
faulty servers, d - initial data  size, k - minimum  number of fragments required for data  
reconstruction, l -number of leakage faulty servers, n  - total number of fragments, n1   
-number of fragments  in the first split, n2   -number of fragments  in  the second split, N  - 
number of servers, p - minimum  number of fragments that reveals any information about 
data,  r  -number of servers  in  a row  in  the logical grid. 
 
 PASIS POTSHARDS GridSharing 
Data encryption, secrecy Various threshold schemes Perfect sharing scheme: Perfect sharing scheme: 
 adapted to  information type 
XOR  splitting n1  of n1 XOR  splitting 
Data resilience, availability Threshold schemes p-k-n Threshold splitting k of n2 Fragments replication 
 
Key  management 
 
Depending on the  chosen 
 
Keyless 
 
Keyless 
 protection method   
Integrity and  recovery Repair agents, auditing Algebraic signature Voting system 
 
Defragmentation 
 
Directory service  maps 
 
User  knows  shards indexes 
 
Voting system: user  asks 
 objects and  fragments. and  data decomposition. In multiple servers for one 
 Fragment name contains case  of indexes loss: use of fragment and  chooses  the 
 the  node  location and  the approximate pointers. most  appropriate fragment 
 local  name.  from  received answers. 
Trusted element PASIS agent integrated Data transformation Client system 
 within the  client system component  
Blocks  for compromise k of n k of n2   for each  of n1 n 
  fragments  
Storage space nd n1n2d 
   
r 
 
(r − l − b) N 
d 
l+b                               r 
 
 GridSharing takes into account the possibility that storage servers can leak 
information (they can reveal their content and state to an adversary, but execute the 
specified protocols faithfully) or be Byzantine (they can deviate from the specified protocol, 
they can also reveal their fragments) faulty, as well as the fact that some of them can crash. 
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It introduces a new l-b-c scheme, in which a l number of servers is leakage-only faulty, not 
more than b servers can be Byzantine faulty, and not more than c servers can crash. 
 The work shows high computation overhead of the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. 
A combination of two mechanisms is proposed in order to overcome inevitable 
performance problems. The first one implies the use of an XOR perfect sharing scheme, 
where all the fragments are needed for secret recovery. Replicating fragments on servers 
and implementing a voting system (for each share at least (2b+1) responses must be 
received and the value returned by at least (b+1) servers is the correct one) to determine 
incoherent fragments is the second mechanism. 
 Two allocation schemes of fragments on n servers are presented. In the direct 
approach servers are arranged in a logical grid having (l+b+1) rows, with at least (3b+c+1) 
servers in each row. Data is split in the same number of fragments as the number of rows. 
Then, each fragment is replicated along one row. In the second approach named 
GridSharing, each of the servers contains a couple of fragments. n servers are arranged in 
the form of a logical rectangular grid with r rows and n/r columns. As in the first approach, 
servers in the same row replicate the same data. 
 GridSharing system comes with stronger security than encryption-based techniques 
and an easy way of data sharing in collaborative environment. Dimensions of the 
architectural framework can be varied to trade-off between the number of required servers, 
the storage blow-up and recovery computation time. 
7.2.3. Potshards 
 In 2007, the POTSHARDS [Storer…09] project from UCSC addressed the need of 
providing a secure archive that will be able to last for years. Its basic concept is to distribute 
the data between several cooperating organizations forming an archive system. 
 To assure archive longevity, the authors decided to use secret splitting schemes 
instead of encryption for two reasons. First of all, key management over years can be 
expensive and there is no guarantee that a couple of keys will not be lost. Secondly, even the 
strongest encryption is only computationally secure and can become easily breakable with 
the development of new technologies and within the long period of time as the objective is 
to preserve data for decades. 
 Before being stored in POTSHARDS archive, the data is processed in two splitting 
layers. The first splitting layer uses an XOR-based algorithm to generate random fragments 
from user data. Each of produced fragments reveals no information about the original data. 
In order to recover information, one needs to possess all fragments. Availability is the goal 
of the second splitting layer, which takes as input fragments coming from the first split. It 
applies the Shamir’s threshold scheme and replaces each fragment with a group of shards - 
data pieces of the same length than the initial fragment. Only few shards are needed for the 
fragment reconstruction. Finally, shards are randomly distributed across independent 
organizations. POTSHARDS assures data integrity by the use of algebraic signatures. 
 Objects, fragments, and shards can be identified by their IDs. After data distribution, 
a user obtains a list of indexes corresponding to his archived objects. Because it is possible 
for this list to be lost, shards include additional portions of information called approximate 
pointers. Pointers of one shard show the archive region where shards from the same object 
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are located. As a consequence, a user can recover data from shards even if all other 
information, such as the index, is lost. An intruder would have to steal all of the shards that 
approximate pointers refer to. This implies, among other things, to be able to bypass the 
authentication mechanisms of each archive. 
 In case of loss of a part of the stored data, a recovery is possible with the 
collaboration of all of the implied archives. While rebuilding data, participating archives 
reveal no information about their contents. First, archives agree on the destination of the 
data to be recovered by choosing a new fail-over archive. Then recovery process occurs in 
multiple rounds during which each of collaborating archive generates a random block and 
XORs it with a block of data needed for reconstruction. All the blocks generated in one 
round are XOR-ed together and send to the fail-over archive. At the end, the fail-over 
archive receives the random blocks used during the recovery process and calculates the lost 
data.  
 POTSHARDS system provides an information-theoretical security and does not 
require any key management. With enough time, it is possible to recover data even if shards 
location maps have been lost. Collaboration between organizations allows rebuilding a lost 
archive, but also implies the existence of a trade-off between secrecy and reliability. The 
cost of having a long-term archive is the amount of required storage: both the secrecy and 
availability splits are space consuming. 
Table 17 
 
Comparison of bitwise data dispersion for commercial storage systems. Blocks 
for  compromise - number of fragments needed for data  recovery, d - initial data  
size, k - minimum  number of fragments required for  data  reconstruction, n  - total 
number of fragments. 
 
                                                               Cleversafe
®
                    Symform                                      SecureParser
®
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         n d / k 
  
 
 Cleversafe [Cleversafe] is one of the first commercial solutions implementing data 
dispersal as a way to provide security. Its dispersed storage network offers a complete 
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software and hardware architecture for private cloud storage. Petabyte scalability, 
reliability and decreasing storage space are the key drivers of the project. 
 The data processing is done at the source or in a dedicated hardware element. While 
fragmenting, a user chooses the level of redundancy that he wishes to obtain. Then, data is 
transformed and encrypted using the AONT-RS approach [Rivest 97], which combines the 
All Or Nothing Transform [Resch…11] with Reed-Solomon erasure code [Reed…60]. First, 
the data is fragmented into words of the same length and each word is encrypted with a 
random key using the AES-256 algorithm. Subsequently, a SHA-256 hash value (a canary) of 
the data is generated in order to provide an integrity check. The next step is to create the 
last word by XOR-ing the canary with the key. It is not possible to reconstruct the data 
unless someone obtains all the fragments and retrieves the key from the last word. For 
availability purposes, Cleversafe applies a modified version of Rabin Information Dispersal 
Algorithm [Rabin 89] on the encrypted data, based on the Reed-Solomon erasure code. As a 
consequence, additional pieces of data are generated, so the user can reconstruct the data 
even if some of the pieces are lost. After the fragmentation, the data is dispersed on random 
storage nodes. 
 For security reasons, data must be secure not only at rest, but also in motion: if the 
attacker intercept the traffic and catches all the fragments, he can be able to reconstruct the 
data. To attain the objective of secure transport of fragments, Cleversafe verifies all nodes 
that would like to join its storage network. Moreover, transported data is protected by the 
use of encryption. No need for key management (because the key is included in the data) 
makes data management less costly. On the other hand, the key is transmitted and stored 
with the data. Once the attacker gains the access to the storage (for example by breaking the 
authentication mechanisms) or arrives to observe the fragments passing through the 
network, he will have all the elements needed for reconstruction of the original data. In 
Cleversafe, data protection relies in inability of the attacker to collect the data from multiple 
locations or to intercept the traffic of the fragments from the storage servers to the client. 
 The major drawback of the AONT-RS approach is its performance on small objects. 
Cleversafe introduces a separate way of processing for such data. The new approach 
abandons the use of time-consuming error correction code processing. Instead, data 
duplication is applied. 
7.2.3. Symform 
 Symform system [Symform] comes with an alternative way of implementing 
distributed storage. It uses the advantages of a peer-to-peer solution to decrease storage 
costs and to provide supplementary security measure based on dispersion in addition to a 
standard data encryption. 
 Symform uses the RAID-96TM patented [Tabbara…11a], [Tabbara…11b], 
[Tabbara…14] technology for data protection and availability. Before being stored in the 
Symform cloud, the data stored in one dedicated folder at user device is divided into 64MB 
blocks and encrypted using the AES-256 algorithm. The unique encryption key for each 
block is the hash of the block itself. Data is encrypted at folder level, so the technique allows 
a de-duplication of data inside the client folder without need for decryption: if a block 
already exists, it will not be up-loaded in the cloud one more time. After encryption, each 
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block is shredded into 64 fragments of 1MB each. Then, 32 parity fragments are added to 
every block using the Reed-Solomon error correction code. This processing results in 96 
fragments corresponding to one block of the original data. These fragments are randomly 
distributed across 96 randomly chosen devices. To reconstruct protected data, 64 out of 96 
fragments need to be assembled. 
 The combination of encryption and fragmentation provides a strong computational 
security. In order to decrypt one single block of data, a malicious user has to find the 
location of the 64 pieces of information, collect them from the storing devices and then 
break the AES-256 encryption, for which the key is twice as long as the AES-128 
recommended by the NIST. This seems to be an insurmountable effort. 
 The weak point of the Symform system is its Cloud Control element responsible for 
the management of fragment locations and encryption keys. Symform user must totally 
trust their cloud provider or encrypt his data by himself before sending it to the cloud. 
Another problem is the fact that such system configuration is not resistant to attacks 
coming from Symform’s insiders, such as malicious employees. 
7.3. Exploiting data structures, confidentiality and machine trustworthiness 
 In case of a known data structure, fragmentation process can be improved by taking 
into account the uneven need for secrecy of different types of data. This way, confidential 
data can be separated from non-sensitive information and the storage place of both parts 
can be appropriately adapted. There is no sense in providing special secure architecture for 
the purpose of storage of piece of data, which do not reveal anything confidential. This idea 
was adopted by the authors of the object-oriented Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering 
[Fabre…94], [Fray…86] technique at the end of the last century. Then it has been modified 
to suit the cloud technology and the database as a service concept [Hudic…12], 
[Bkakria…13], [Vimercati…13]. 
 The need of user interaction during decomposition process is one of the biggest 
problems of fragmentation of structured data. Each set of data types will have its own rules 
to define what is confidential and what is not. Moreover, it is possible that the combination 
of two non-confidential data fragments will reveal information about the confidential one. 
This was especially pointed out in [Ciriani…10]. 
 
7.3.1. Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering 
 Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering (FRS) [ Fabre…94] pro- vides accidental and 
intentional fault tolerance.  In a first step,  confidential  objects  belonging  to an application 
are fragmented using a redundant algorithm until  being bro- ken  into  pieces  which  do  
not  reveal  anything sensitive. Redundancy is  achieved  by  the  use  of error  processing 
techniques  (like error correcting  codes) or by anticipating the  application  design  at   the  
early  stage   of  designing objects.   At the e n d , t h e  f r a g m e n t e d  data   is scattered over 
various workstations. Leftover fragments, which are still holding confidential informat ion  
after the first step, are encrypted or stored on trusted devices. All remaining pieces are 
distributed over untrusted sites. Data processing, fragmentation, and defragmentation can be 
performed only on trusted sites. After a l m o s t  two decades, the FRS technique from 
[Fabre…94] has been implemented in [Chougoule…11] using .net remoting. 
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7.3.2. Database fragmentation 
 Database as a service (DBaaS) [Cloud_Database] delivers similar functionality to 
classic, relational, or NoSQL database management systems in parallel to providing 
flexibility and scalability of an on-demand platform. The DBaaS user does not worry about 
the database provisioning issues, as the cloud provider responsibility is to maintain, back-
up, upgrade and handle physical failures of the database system. Therefore, simplicity and 
cost effectiveness are the biggest advantages of such solution. 
 However, data owner loses control over outsourced data. This creates new security 
and privacy risks, especially when the concerned databases contain sensitive data, such as 
health records or financial information. In consequence, securing database services has 
become a need of paramount importance. A straightforward solution to the problem 
involves the encryption of the data before sending it to the storage provider. Large 
overhead and query processing limitation are the main drawbacks of such an approach. K-
anonymization [Sweeney 02], t-closeness [Li 07] and l-diversity [Machanavajjhala 07] 
anonymization techniques are seen as a way of minimizing these inconveniences. In France, 
works on this subject has been recently done mainly for health data [Bergeat…14]. 
 Database fragmentation promises an interesting alternative to database full 
encryption or full anonymization. One of the first works on the subject [Aggarwal…05] 
introduces a distributed architecture for preserving data privacy. A trusted client 
communicates with the end-user and utilizes two untrusted servers belonging to different 
storage providers ensuring physical separation of the information to be protected. By 
construction, storage providers do have access to the information that users entrust them 
with. Even if they are well aware that they should not incorrectly interact with the user’s 
data and its integrity without endangering their own business, it is a common assumption 
to suppose them to be “honest but curious”: they have the ability to observe, move, and 
replicate stored data, especially behind the virtualization mechanism. In [Aggarwal…05], 
outsourced data is partitioned among the two untrusted servers in a way that content at 
any one server do not breach data privacy. In order to obtain valuable information an 
adversary must gain access to both databases. Similarly, the system is also protected from 
insider attacks and the curiosity of the providers as long they do not ally together. 
Moreover, queries involving only one of the fragments are executed much more efficiently 
than on encrypted data. Nevertheless, this privacy-preserving outsourcing solution has a 
serious limitation. It assumes that the two servers are not allowed to communicate with 
each other. In a real world scenario such a condition can be hard to guarantee.  
Another work [Ciriani…10], [Vimercati…13] comes with a solution for protection of 
confidentiality of sensitive information, based on mixing encryption and fragmentation. It 
defines confidentiality constraint as a subset containing one or more of relation 
attributes. Constraint involving only one attribute implies that value of the constraint 
attribute is sensitive and the only way of protecting it is the use of encryption. On the other 
hand, multi-attributes constraints specify that only association between the attributes of a 
given constraint are sensitive. In that case, there is no need to encrypt all the attributes 
values, because confidentiality can be ensured by fragmentation. 
 In [Ciriani…10], three scenarios of fragmenting a relation are presented. In the first 
one, a relation is divided into two fragments, which does not contain sensitive combination 
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of non-encrypted attributes. The second scenario splits the relation into multiple fragments 
in a way that a query can always be evaluated on one of the fragments: each fragment 
contains non-encrypted attributes that does not violate the confidentiality constraints, as 
well as the encryption of all other attributes. Last fragmentation scenario avoids the use of 
encryption by introducing a trusted party (belonging to the data owner) for the storage of 
sensitive portion of data. 
 For each scenario, the authors associate fragmentation metrics supporting the 
definition of an appropriate fragmentation algorithm. Fragmentation metrics can aim at 
minimizing the number of fragments, maximization of affinity between attributes stored in 
one fragment or minimization of querying costs. 
 Bkakria’s work [Bkakria…13] generalizes the approach presented in previous 
paragraphs to a database containing multiple relations. It introduces a new confidentiality 
constraint for protection of relationship between tables. Sensitive associations between 
relations are secured by the protection of primary key/foreign key relationships and 
separation (called vertical fragmentation) of the involved relations. Relations are 
transformed into secure fragments in which subsets of attributes respecting confidentiality 
constraints are stored in plaintext, while all others are encrypted. It introduces a parameter 
for evaluating the query execution cost and proposes a query transformation and 
optimization model for executing queries on distributed fragments. It also concentrates on 
the issue of preserving data unlinkability while executing queries on multiple fragments. 
Indeed, providers can collude with each other and then deduct information by observing 
query execution. To avoid such situation, [Bkakria…13] proposes the use of an improved 
Private Information Retrieval [Olumofin…10] technique, which allows querying a database 
without revealing query results to service providers. Results of implementation of the 
proposed approach are presented. Although the modified PIR solution is much faster than 
its predecessor, the processing time of record retrieval from multiple fragments is 
considerably slower in comparison to querying a single fragment. 
 The idea of splitting database into fragments stored at different cloud providers was 
also proposed in [Hudic…12]. In this approach, a database is first normalized and then 
different security levels (high, medium, low) are attributed to relations. Basing on these 
three levels and specific user requirements, data is encrypted, stored at local domain or 
distributed between providers. 
 All of the fragmentation methods presented in this subsection remain limited in 
terms of number of fragments. Moreover, proposed fragmentation algorithms in each case 
require user interaction in order to define data confidentiality level. 
7.4. Conclusion 
 In previous sections we analyzed existing distributed storage systems providing 
additional secrecy by use of fragmentation. We also presented database fragmentation 
solution separating data in order to avoid full encryption. Few systems focus on providing a 
long term, secure and non-costly storage of data. Another motivation is the possibility of 
minimizing encryption inside databases, while still providing a good level of data 
protection. 
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7.4.1. Some issues and recommendations 
 In order to design an efficient storage system for fragmented data some problems 
still need to be overcome.  
First, a process of fragment dispersion requires the assurance of securing data 
separation. A situation where data is fragmented, but where we would not or could not 
control where fragments are stored has to be considered as a weak situation. Using multiple 
independent providers can be a rapid and coarse-grained solution ([Aggarwal…09], 
[Hudic…12]), however, it can entail significant latency costs. An alternative could be the 
storage of data at one single provider site with the guarantee of physical separation. 
Unfortunately, the majority of cloud providers use virtualization, which prevents an end-
user from such a control. With the development of bare-metal [Bare-metal] clouds like 
Trans-Lattice Storm [TransLattice_Storm], Internap [Internap] or Rackspace OnMetal 
[Rackspace], we believe it could be possible to control physical location of outsourced data 
within a single provider. 
 Second, there is a lack of published results showing performance allowing 
comparison between dispersed storage systems and the most common ones. In any case, 
fragmenting for protection always increases latency inside a system. Nevertheless, a good 
fragmentation technique must be combined with parallelization of processing to reach 
acceptable overall performance. It also should take into consideration the uneven levels of 
confidentiality requiring different level of protection for a collection of fragments. We have 
seen in this report (published in [Qiu…15]) how these ideas have been successfully utilized 
and developed for selective encryption of images using a General Purpose GPU (GPGPU).  
 Long term storage have a double issue with key management: the keys can be lost, 
the keys can no longer protect the data due to the constant progresses of hardware 
efficiency and cryptanalysis. 
Last, but not least, fragmenting structured data strongly benefits from user 
interaction for definition of the confidentiality levels and depends a lot on the nature of the 
dataset. Designing an algorithm for separating confidential data from non-sensitive pieces 
would make the storage process much faster and easier to use. 
8. Future Work 
 
The results presented in this report are “work in progress” and we are just getting started. 
We have seen that due to constant progress in hardware architectures and cryptology these results 
are and will be constantly evolving. We defined a number of high level requirements at the 
beginning of this report. Some have been met. Moreover, we feel that more work remain to be 
done and is foreseeable to mature our results to satisfy a wider range of applications. 
8.1. More security, more security analysis 
We analyzed the level of security of the different FED methods with various statistics be 
correlation or entropy functions. We feel that it still remains to be able to define some formal 
method in order to compare these various methods and set their parameters in an optimal fashion 
with regard to the desired security level. It also remains to consider, test, and benchmark specific 
attack resistance, and understand possible strength and vulnerabilities of these methods. For 
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instance, we have to better understand the effect of dispersion or the usage of decoys on security, 
none of the security analysis takes this aspect of our method into account. We also have to 
provide with at least a methodology and recommendations on protecting the map associated with 
a given fragmentation.  
8.2. Agnosticism 
We claimed agnosticism for our methods. However, we still need to run a number of 
experiments associated with security analysis for diverse data formats and nature such as high 
definition image resolutions like HD, truecolor or widely used compressed image standards like 
JPEG, NPG. This should be a simple extension of the work presented in section 6. Addressing 
audio and video formats is key in order to propose a more general system to protect all kinds of 
information. We also have to study various use cases, for instance, it is worth noticing that our 
method can also be used for soft encryption purposes. 
8.3. Memory, performance, energy, and benchmark 
Memory occupation and performance are critical and greatly influence the choice of one 
method versus another. We have seen the influence of the hardware architecture over the 
software architecture, particularly when using GPU with their issue of performance portability. 
We defined a benchmark from an end-user viewpoint for this very reason. Today, we need to be 
vigilant about technology progress since best in class solution is platform dependent. Using 
multiple processors is calling for considering energy consumption, and we are convinced that 
some energy can be easily saved without degrading performance.  
8.4. Fragmentation and transmission 
We have been studying fragmentation for protecting data during its storage. It remains to 
look at using this technique for protecting data during its transmission along all kind of networks. 
Early, analyses of this question are quite encouraging. 
8.5. Defragmentation avoidance 
We have seen that FHE had poor performance that fundamentally hinders its deployment. 
We are interested in looking once more in multiparty computation or linear secret sharing (LSS) 
([Archer…2015]) which looks so promising despite the same hurdle. 
8.6. Towards a general architecture 
We designed and implemented several methods combining security with resilience while 
optimizing storage space and costs. They are agnostic supporting all kind of data of any nature or 
structure. Then, we will concentrate on overcoming performance issues by the use of parallel 
processing. As a final and most important step, we see the data separation along levels of 
confidentiality in order to address scalability. 
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Figure 28: Data storage principle regarding multilevel data confidentiality 
Figure 28 is a simplified version of Figure 1 : ‘Cone of confidentiality’: Data 
confidentiality, machine trustworthiness, and data size. It shows the principle driving the 
architecture of our system. It can be considered as the projection of the ‘cone’ described in Figure 
1 onto the (trustworthiness, confidentiality) dimensions. In a first approach, we divide the data 
into three categories: ultra-confidential, confidential and non-confidential (some banking 
organizations have four levels). Storage cost effectiveness is addressed by adapting the type of 
storage architecture to the level of confidentiality of these data. A trusted area, which will usually 
belong to a data owner who is in control of every process and data hosted in this area, will be 
used to store the most sensitive data as well as area of defragmentation. The rest of the data may 
go to two types of clouds. The non-confidential part of information will be kept inside popular 
public clouds that use virtualization with a cost effective contract. Information that can 
potentially reveal a secret may go to bare metals clouds, which provides more control of data 
location and isolation than the virtualization-based approach. Obviously, we are looking at 
minimizing the amount of data to be stored inside the most expensive zone and minimizing 
overall storage cost. 
 Finally, our ultimate goal is to design an architecture which is at the same time cost 
effective, efficient in terms of performance and effective in terms of protection. This solution will 
be intensively enabled by the existence of a large numbers of servers organized in public clouds 
and private distributed systems. 
9. General Conclusion 
 
The usual response when it comes to support data protection and privacy, is to transform 
(encryption using a key being a special case) the information to keep it unreadable or partially 
unreadable by someone who has not enough right and has not been given the way to inverse the 
said transformation. The usual response to guarantee some data resilience is to replicate it in 
order to keep information recoverable and available despite failures or attacks. After all, Mother 
Nature is using similar processes with encoding and replicating precious DNA molecules. The 
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problem comes with scalability and duration: the need to both protect and keep safe large amount 
of information possibly for a long period of time. With massive amount of data or with all kind of 
continuous data streams production, costs of traditional protection by full encryption processes or 
of resilience by sheer data replication increase too rapidly. This is true either in term of 
performance and energy consumption relatively to encryption processes or in term of memory 
relatively to the replication processes. Our current work is showing that this problem can be 
addressed in a three prong approach: fragmentation and massive parallelization (in particular, 
exploiting GPUs), encryption of information along gradual level of confidentiality, and at last, 
dispersion of the said fragments over a large network of machines potentially organized into one 
or multiple clouds with various levels of trustworthiness.  
Today, we feel that the concept fragmentation has started to mature and is seriously 
considered by the industry: IBM recently bought out Cleversafe one of the technologies we 
presented in Table 17 for $1.3B
4
. We feel that the concept of dispersion deserves more attention 
and more experimentation. It is quite clear that the way fragments are distributed over different 
physical devices is bringing more or less additional protection and robustness to the system; at 
the same time, it can bring more or less latency. It is quite clear that dispersing data over different 
providers, in particular between private and public areas can bring more or less cost 
effectiveness. 
Our work started with the strong belief that the nature of the data ought to be taken into 
consideration and algorithms ought to be designed and specialized according to the fact that data 
is an image, a video, or a text. We are ending up this project by delivering three algorithms 
agnostic with regards to the nature or type of data by both considering data not as a stream of 
zeros and ones but by considering data as a two dimensional matrix and dealing with integrity of 
the diverse transformations (recommending the usage of DWT/LeGall over DCT that we were 
using at the beginning of this study, DFT, or FFT) and cyphers. We believe that this unexpected 
result joined to the usage of GPU for performance will allow broadening the scope of 
applications particularly of selective encryption.  
It was difficult to find related work in the literature (mostly for terminology reason). It 
was not that easy to convince oneself of the validity of the concepts that have been presented. 
The potential issues with performance and latency was constantly pregnant in our study. Today, 
our work is hopefully clearly showing that fragmentation, encryption, and dispersion can be seen 
as a general and potent process to efficiently protect data. We believe it is still early to see them 
widely used. Although it is still an open question to mathematically compare and position one 
security method versus another one, we gathered a set of security analysis which allowed us 
checking our three algorithms for security. Our objective was, starting from the briefly presented 
state of the art in section 7, to address few of the challenges considered in section 2 and 4 by 
designing a system that would be more efficient than just encrypting the information to be 
protected. We are finishing this project producing three new algorithms of 
fragmentation/defragmentation, and demonstrated their competitiveness against full encryption in 
terms of performance, scalability, resilience, and protection. 
                                                 
4 : https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-24/ibm-paid-1-3-billion-to-acquire-cleversafe-in-
hybrid-cloud-push  
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12. Annex: technical environment and access to the code 
 
We provide here, the list of GPU architectures and various hardware platforms that have been 
used for developing code and experimenting on data protection. Follows the list of software used 
to perform transformations or encryption, then, the urls to access to the code. 
 
Hardware: 
Laptop,   
GPU: Nvidia Nvs 5200M 
CPU:Intel I7-3630QM 
CPU:Intel I7-4770HQ (Apple Macbook) 
Desktop,   
GPU: Nvidia Geforce GTX 780 
CPU Intel I7-4770K 
Mobile, 
Apple Cortex A8 Chip (Apple iphone6) 
 
Teralab Hardware platform (https://www.teralab-datascience.fr/fr/) 
 
Software: 
Windows 7, Visual studio 2012, CUDA 5.5/6.0, Eclipse Luna, Matlab 
Xcode 7.0 SDK (apple develop software platform) 
DCT: Nvidia CUDA SDK: https://developer.nvidia.com/cuda-code-samples 
DWT: Nvidia CUDA SDK: https://developer.nvidia.com/cuda-code-samples (modified from other 
open-source project by using the CUDA SDK) 
AES: Cryptoo++: www.cryptopp.com 
SHA-512, SHA-256: http://hashcat.net/oclhashcat/ 
 
Teralab Software platform 
 
Data: 
Test images used in this paper are very well known and can be found in many 
publications. Their bitmap format can be found under the names of ‘Barbara’ and ‘baboon’ in 
various open test image databases and are accessible from the web. 
Data from the ITEA2 CAP project, from La Poste, the French Post Office. 
 
Code: 
The C / C++ code on selective encryption is available at: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/p4mloc2hlp946kv/AADXLcnvWljvxwbybKqXoa5wa?dl=0 
The Java code on fragmentation/defragmentation is available at: 
https://github.com/kasiakapusta/fragmentation with the username: CAPmember and the 
password: CAPItea2Fragm 
